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TO BE OR NOTE TO BE A SECURITY:
REVES v. ERNST & YOUNG
In response to the lack of investor confidence after the stock market crash
of 1929,' Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act)2 and Secur-
ities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act or collectively, Securities Acts).'
Through this legislation, Congress sought to "eliminate serious abuses in a
largely unregulated securities market."4 To achieve its goal, Congress cre-
1. See FitzGibbon, What Is a Security?-A Redefinition Based on Eligibility to Partici-
pate in the Financial Markets, 64 MINN. L. REv. 893, 915 (1980) ("the following causal chain
existed: (i) fraud and similar misconduct led to speculation, which, aggravated by market
manipulation, resulted in (ii) the Crash, which in turn caused (iii) loss of confidence in the
financial markets .... The securities laws intended to prevent the recurrence of this pro-
cess."); see also 2 J. ELLENBERGER & E. MAHAR, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES
ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE AT 1934 (1973); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALY-
SIS OF LAW 331 (2d ed. 1977).
2. Ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1988)). The
Senate Report on the Securities Act of 1933 states:
The purpose of this bill is to protect the investing public and honest business. The
basic policy is that of informing the investor of the facts concerning securities to be
offered for sale in interstate and foreign commerce and providing protection against
fraud and misrepresentation.
The aim is to prevent further exploitation of the public by the sale of unsound,
fraudulent, and worthless securities through misrepresentation; to place adequate
and true information before the investor; to protect honest enterprise, seeking capital
by honest presentation, against the competition afforded by dishonest securities of-
fered to the public through crooked promotion; to restore the confidence of the pro-
spective investor in his ability to select sound securities ....
S. REP No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933), reprinted in 2 ELLENBERGER & MAHAR, supra
note 1, at item 17.
3. Ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1988)).
4. United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975). The preamble to
the 1934 Act sets forth its objectives:
[T]ransactions in securities as commonly conducted upon securities exchanges and
over-the-counter markets are affected with a national public interest which makes it
necessary to provide for regulation and control of such transactions and of practices
and matters related thereto, including transactions by officers, directors, and princi-
pal security holders, to require appropriate reports to remove impediments to and
perfect the mechanisms of a national market system for securities and a national
system for the clearance and settlement of securities transactions and the safeguard-
ing of securities and funds related thereto, and to impose requirements necessary to
make such regulation and control reasonably complete and effective, in order to pro-
tect interstate commerce, the national credit, the Federal taxing power, to protect
and make more effective the national banking system and Federal Reserve System,
and to insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets ....
15 U.S.C. § 78b.
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ated a complete disclosure system which included registration 5 and report-
ing requirements6 for issuers of securities, as well as antifraud provisions.'
By requiring disclosure of material information' to investors, Congress
hoped to reinstate investor confidence in the market. 9
While the scope of the Securities Acts encompasses a broad spectrum of
transactions, '0 parties seeking protection under the Securities Acts must first
assert federal subject matter jurisdiction." For a federal court to have juris-
diction over a transaction under the Securities Acts, a party must establish
that the instrument involved in the transaction is a security.' 2 In section 2(1)
5. Id at §§ 77e-h. Registration is intended to provide the investor with sufficient and
accurate disclosure of material facts concerning the company and the securities it proposes to
sell. R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION--CASES AND MATERIALS 38 (6th
ed. 1987). Registration requires filing a form with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) that discloses, among other things, a description of the registrant's business, information
about the registrant's management, certified financial statements, and a description of the se-
curity to be offered and its relationship to other capital securities of the registrant. Id. at 39.
Once the registration becomes effective, the securities may be sold. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e-h.
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78m. The reporting requirements require companies to file annual and
other periodic reports with the SEC in order to update the information contained in the origi-
nal registration form. In addition, annual reports must be sent to the shareholders. Extensive
rules govern the disclosure of information. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-l1 (1941) (regulation
of disclosure in connection with shareholder elections of directors); 17 C.F.R. § 240.141-10
(1991) (regulation of disclosure in connection with tender offers).
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 771, 77q (1933 Act); id § 78j (1934 Act). Section 12 of the 1933 Act
imposes civil liability on any person who violates the registration provisions and on any person
who makes untrue statements or omissions in the offer or sale of a security. Id. § 771. Section
17 of the 1933 Act provides for criminal sanctions for fraud or misrepresentation in connection
with the sale of securities. Id. § 77q, x. Section 10b of the 1934 Act is a broad antifraud
provision covering transactions involving the purchase and sale of securties. Id. § 78j.
8. A fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder
would consider it important in deciding how to vote. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426
U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
9. See S. REP. No. 47, supra note 2.
10. In addition to conventional stocks and bonds, courts have applied the Securities Acts
to an array of instruments. See, e.g., International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439
U.S. 551 (1979) (noncontributory pension plans); Smith v. Gross, 604 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1979)
(earthworm enterprise); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974)
(franchise agreements); Glen-Arden Commodities, Inc. v. Costantino, 493 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir.
1974) (whiskey warehouse receipts).
11. Section 22(a) of the 1933 Act provides for federal jurisdiction for suits brought under
that Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a). Jurisdiction for suits brought under the 1934 Act is provided by
section 27 of that Act. Id. § 78aa.
12. The registration, reporting, and antifraud provisions each refer to a security and
therefore only apply if a security is involved in the transaction. For example, it is unlawful to
sell a security "[ulnless a registration statement is in effect as to a security." 15 U.S.C. § 77e.
Further, the antifraud provision in section 10b only applies to fraudulent acts "in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security." Id § 78j. The Supreme Court has recognized that
the definitions of a security in both the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act are "virtually identical."
United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847 n.12 (1975). Thus, the judicial
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of the 1933 Act 13 and in section 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act,14 Congress defined
"security" as broadly as possible in an attempt to ensure coverage of "the
many types of instruments that in our commercial world fall within the ordi-
nary concept of a security."15
The evolution of the securities markets has seen the arrival of innovative
instruments that do not neatly fit the Securities Acts' definitions of a secur-
ity. 6 Consequently, the United States Supreme Court has attempted to es-
tablish universal tests or guidelines for determining whether non-traditional
instruments fall within the security definition.' 7 In SEC v. W. J. Howey
Co., ' the Supreme Court originated the underlying principle to determine
interpretation of "security" and the scope of coverage under the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act is
the same. See Jacobs, The Meaning of "Security" Under Rule lOb-5, 29 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv.
211, 224-33 (1984). The 1934 Act defines a security as follows:
When used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires...
(10) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil,
gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preorganization
certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust cer-
tificate, certificate of deposit, for a security, any put, call, straddle, option, or privi-
lege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including
any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option,
or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign cur-
rency, or in general, any instrument commonly known as a "security"; or any certifi-
cate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not
include currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which
has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days
of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10).
13. IdL § 77a.
14. Id. § 78c(a)(10).
15. SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933), reprinted in 2 ELLENBERGER & MAHER, supra note 1, item 10
(1973)). Congress intended to ensure complete coverage of investments; however, most courts
and commentators agree that the Securities Acts were designed to protect solely "investments"
and not the everyday commercial instrument such as the private loan transaction. See, e.g.,
Comment, Commercial Notes And Definition of "Security" Under Securities Exchange Act of
1934: A Note Is A Note Is A Note?. 52 NEB. L. Rnv. 478, 485-88 (1973) (where the author
reveals Congress' preoccupation with "investments" throughout the legislative history).
16. See supra note 10. The Court in SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp. recognized:
[Tihe reach of the [1933] Act does not stop with the obvious and commonplace.
Novel, uncommon, or irregular devices, whatever they appear to be, are also reached
if it be proved as matter of fact that they were widely offered or dealt in under terms
or courses of dealing which established their character in commerce as "investment
contracts," or as "any interest or instrument commonly known as a 'security.'"
320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 74-109.
18. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
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the status of an instrument for purposes of securities regulation. In Howey,
the Court created a test that disregards the form of the instrument and in-
stead looks to the substance of the instrument and the economic realities of
the transaction. 9 Since Howey, the Court has modified the boundaries of
the economic realities principle when attempting to determine whether a va-
riety of unconventional instruments are covered by the Securities Acts. 20
Although "note" is specifically enumerated in the Securities Acts' defini-
tions of "security,"21 courts do not unequivocally find notes to be securities
because notes are used in a variety of contexts. A note may function as both
a commercial vehicle, which is not a security,22 as well as an investment
vehicle, which courts have deemed to be a security.23 Because notes may or
19. Id4 at 298. The test is whether there is a "contract, transaction or scheme whereby a
person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the
efforts of [others]." Id. at 298-99. The Court noted that, by including "investment contract"
in the definition, Congress was using a term that had been "crystallized by this prior judicial
interpretation." Id at 298. Therefore, the substance-over-form principle and the resulting test
was based on state courts' construction of an "investment contract." See State v. Evans, 154
Minn. 95, 191 N.W. 425 (1922); State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 56, 177
N.W. 937, 938 (1920); State v. Heath, 199 N.C. 135, 153 S.E. 855 (1930); Klatt v. Guaranteed
Bond Co., 213 Wis. 12, 250 N.W. 825 (1933).
20. See infra note 82.
21. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10); see supra note 12 (definition).
22. The district court in Robertson v. White, the lower court opinion in Reves v. Ernst &
Young, 110 S. Ct. 945 (1990), described why commericial notes should not be securities:
Because notes are included within the definition of security, the mischievous possibil-
ity exists that every time a person or a bank extends a loan to another, and receives
his note in return, a federal case is made out if the obligor has failed to register his
"offering" or has inflated his net worth on a financial statement. No one seriously
contends that the historic 73rd Congress intended so to trivialize the regulation of
securities transactions.
Robertson v. White, 635 F. Supp. 851, 861 (W.D. Ark. 1986), rev'd sub non. Arthur Young &
Co. v. Reves, 856 F.2d 52 (8th Cir. 1988), rev'd sub nom. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 110 S. Ct.
945 (1990); see National Bank of Commerce v. All Am. Assurance Co., 583 F.2d 1295, 1300-
01 (5th Cir. 1978) (bank loans were devoid of investment aspects and therefore not securities);
Amfac Mortgage Corp. v. Arizona Mall of Tempe, Inc., 583 F.2d 426, 434 (9th Cir. 1978)
(loan secured by a building was not a security because context indicated a commercial financ-
ing transaction rather than an investment of risk capital); Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche
Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1138 (2d Cir. 1976) (character loan was not a security because of
commercial context); Oliver v. Bostetter, 426 F. Supp. 1082, 1085 (D. Md. 1977) (a note issued
by individuals in connection with a consumer transaction was not a security because Congress
did not intend acts to cover garden-variety notes).
23. In Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, the Court held that a note "may now be viewed
as a relatively broad term that encompasses instruments with widely varying characteristics,
depending on whether issued in a consumer context, as commercial paper, or in some other
investment context." 471 U.S. 681, 694 (1985) (citing Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of
Governors, 468 U.S. 137, 149-53 (1984)); see also Ingenito v. Bermec Corp., 376 F. Supp.
1154, 1180 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (notes given to invest in herd of cattle found to be securities based
on investment character); Hall v. Security Planning Serv., Inc., 371 F. Supp. 7, 14 (D. Ariz.
1974) (notes of a corporation bought by the public were investments and therefore securities).
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may not be securities, the status of note instruments under the Securities
Acts has perplexed federal courts. The First, Third, Fifth, Seventh, and
Tenth Circuits adhered to the commercial/investment test to determine
whether the Securities Acts regulate notes.14 The Sixth and Ninth Circuits
employed the risk capital test.2" The Second Circuit applied the family re-
semblance test to determine whether a note is a security.26 Finally, the
Eighth Circuit and District of Columbia Circuit applied the Howey test to
note transactions to determine whether they involved regulated securities.
2 7
24. For a discussion of the commercial/investment test, see infra text accompanying notes
114-39. Under the commercial/investment test, courts look to whether the note can be char-
acterized as commercial or investment in nature. If the note is a commercial instrument, then
it is not a security. Conversely, if a note is an investment instrument, then it is a security. See,
e.g., Futura Dev. Corp. v. Centex Corp., 761 F.2d 33, 40 (1st Cir.) (promissory note issued in
connection with sale of property is not a security because it was a substitute for sales price
rather than an investment), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 850 (1985); Hunssinger v. Rockford Business
Credits, Inc., 745 F.2d 484, 488 (7th Cir. 1984) (note issued in exchange for bank loans is
commercial in nature and thus not a security); Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank, 495 F.2d 1109, 1113
(5th Cir. 1974) (renewal note from a bank loan not a security because it had no investment
characteristics); Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546, 551 (10th Cir. 1974) (notes given to obtain
funds to promote a corporation are investments and therefore securities); Lino v. City Invest-
ing Co., 487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973) (notes used to pay for franchise center are commercial
and therefore not securities). See generally FitzGibbon, supra note 1, at 937-40 (criticizing the
commercial/investment test for its laundry list of factors that results in a case-by-case determi-
nation); Sonnenschein, Federal Securities Law Coverage of Note Transactions: The Antifraud
Provisions, 35 Bus. LAW. 1567, 1589-95 (1980) (examining the Fifth and Seventh Circuits'
application of the commercial/investment test).
25. For a discussion of the risk capital test, see infra text accompanying notes 140-55.
Under the risk capital test, courts determine whether risk capital was subject to the efforts of
others. If the purchaser invested risk capital, then the note would be a security. See, e.g.,
Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. Commercial Credit Business Loans, Inc., 651 F.2d 1174, 1181-
82 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1124 (1981); Great Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532
F.2d 1252, 1267 (9th Cir. 1976) (unsecured short-term note issued to secure a line of credit was
not a security because issuer did not invest risk capital subject to efforts of others). See gener-
ally Sonnenschein, supra note 24, at 1595-1601 (examining the six factors of the risk capital
test).
26. For a discussion of the family resemblance test, see infra text accompanying notes
156-80. Under the family resemblance test, courts presume that notes are covered by the Se-
curities Acts unless the presumption is rebutted by showing a strong family resemblance to a
judicially crafted list of non-securities. See, e.g., Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co.,
544 F.2d, 1126, 1138 (2nd Cir. 1976) (unsecured notes purchased from a brokerage house are
securities because they do not resemble a listed non-security). See generally FitzGibbon, supra
note 1, at 938-40 (criticizing the test for its failure to recognize which factors are relevent and
how they should be weighed); Sonnenschein, supra note 24, at 1601-05 (noting that the test
provides more certain and consistent decisions).
27. For a discussion of the Howey test, see infra text accompanying notes 78-92. The
Howey test asks whether the instrument involves an investment of money in a common enter-
prise with the expectation of profits arising solely from the efforts of others. See, e.g., Arthur
Young & Co. v. Reves, 856 F.2d 52 (8th Cir. 1988) (demand element of a note, though un-
characteristic of a security, may have security status under the Howey test), rev'd sub no.
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 110 S. Ct. 945 (1990); Baurer v. Planning Group, Inc., 669 F.2d 770
1991]
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More than fifty years after Congress enacted the Securities Acts, the
Supreme Court in Reves v. Ernst & Young 2" finally clarified the confusion
over the test courts should apply to determine whether a note is a security.29
By establishing a single test for notes, the Court attempted to eliminate the
inconsistencies that occurred as a result of the divergent approaches of the
lower courts.30
In Reves, the Supreme Court rejected the Howey test for notes and
adopted a modified version of the Second Circuit's family resemblance test
3 '
for determining whether a note is a security.32 The Court established the
rebuttable presumption that an instrument labeled a note is a security. The
presumption is rebutted by "showing that the note bears a strong [family)
resemblance" to one of the judicially enumerated categories of non-securi-
ties.3 Because notes are now presumed to be securities, parties issuing notes
must either comply with Securities Acts' regulations or bear the burden of
rebutting the presumption of coverage.'
In Reves, the Farmer's Cooperative Association of Arkansas and
Oklahoma, Inc. (Co-op), which had offered interest-bearing promissory
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (note given in exchange for funds advanced in anticipation of securing a
limited partnership interest is a security under the Howey test). See generally FitzGibbon,
supra note 1, at 896-908 (examining the three prongs of the Howey test).
28. 110 S. Ct. 945 (1990).
29. Id
30. See infra text accompanying notes 248-94.
31. See Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1976); infra
text accompanying notes 156-80.
32. Reves. 110 S. Ct. at 952.
33. Id The Court adopted the same list of non-securities that the Second Circuit drafted in
Exchange Nat'l Bank-
ITihe note delivered in consumer financing, the note secured by a mortgage on a
home, the short-term note secured by a lien on a small business or some of its assets,
the note evidencing a "character" loan to a bank customer, short-term notes secured
by an assignment of accounts receivable, or a note which simply formalizes an open-
account debt incurred in the ordinary course of business (particularly if, as in the
case of the customer of a broker, it is collateralized).
544 F.2d at 1138; see Reve, 110 S. Ct. at 952. The Court also included "notes evidencing
loans by commercial banks for current operations," which the Second Circuit had previously
added to its list. Id at 951 (quoting Chemical Bank v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 726 F.2d 930,
939 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 884 (1984)). The court in Exchange Nat Bank devised
the list relying on the "context otherwise requires" language preceding the definition of a se-
curity. 544 F.2d at 1137-38 (emphasis omitted). The court noted that the list of non-securities
were "readily" thought of as cases in which the context otherwise required. Id at 1138; see
infra note 72 (discussing context clause).
34. Although the family resemblance test provides additional direction in determining
whether a note will be a security, unless an issuer's note is easily characterized as one of the
listed non-securites, it may be prudent for issuers of notes to comply with the federal securities
laws until judicial precedent construes the Court's test. See infra text accompanying note 291-
93.
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notes to both members and non-members in an effort to raise capital for its
general business operations, sought bankruptcy protection." When the Co-
op went bankrupt, over 1,600 people were holding the uninsured and uncol-
lateralized demand notes.36 A class of the holders of the notes filed suit
against Arthur Young & Co.,31 the firm that audited the Co-op's financial
statements, alleging violations of the antifraud provisions of the 1934 Act
and provisions of Arkansas' securities laws.38
The United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas
concluded that the demand notes were securities under both state and fed-
eral law 39 because the Co-op offered the notes as an investment to a broad
segment of the public.' On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed the lower
court's holding and ruled that the notes were not securities.4 To reach its
conclusion, the appellate court applied two tests previously enunciated by
the United States Supreme Court.4 2 First, the court ruled that the demand
nature of the notes disqualified them as stock according to the test articu-
lated in Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth 13 because the demand feature of
the notes was inconsistent with traditional characteristics of a security."
Next, the court ruled that the notes failed the Howey test for investment
contracts. Because the notes did not have the requisite profit under the
Howey test, they were deemed short-term commercial loans rather than in-
vestments.4 5 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to address
whether the notes were properly excluded from the 1934 Act's definition of a
security."
35. 110 S. Ct. at 946.
36. Id
37. Arthur Young & Co. was the predecessor of Ernst & Young, the petitioner in the case.
Id.
38. I Petitioners alleged that Arthur Young & Co. failed to adhere to generally ac-
cepted accounting principles in an effort to make the co-operative appear solvent. Specifically,
they alleged that Arthur Young & Co. manipulated the accounting principles to inflate the
value of the co-operative's major asset-a gasohol plant. Id
39. Robertson v. White, 635 F. Supp. 851, 863-64 (W.D. Ark. 1986), rev'd sub norn. Ar-
thur Young & Co. v. Reves, 856 F.2d 52 (8th Cir. 1988), rev'd sub norn. Reves v. Ernst &
Young, 110 S. Ct. 945 (1990).
40. See id The court noted that the general trend is that notes that are commercial in
character are not securities while investment notes are securities and a broad scale offering to a
passive public constitutes an investment. Id at 856, 862 (citing Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d
546 (10th Cir. 1974); Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank, 495 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1974)).
41. Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 856 F.2d 52 (8th Cir. 1988), rev'd sub norn. Reves v.
Ernst & Young, 110 S. Ct. 945 (1990).
42. Id at 54.
43. 471 U.S. 681 (1985); see infra text accompanying notes 95-105.
44. Arthur Young & Co., 856 F.2d at 54.
45. Id. at 54-55; see supra note 15 (commercial notes versus investment notes).
46. Reves v. Arthur Young & Co., 109 S. Ct. 3154 (1989).
1991]
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Justice Marshall's majority opinion in Reves reversed the Eighth Circuit
and ruled that the demand notes were securities within the meaning of sec-
tion 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act.47 The Court rejected the application of the
Howey and Landreth Timber tests to note transactions.48 The Court ex-
plained that the tests the Eighth Circuit used are applicable to instruments
other than notes and, therefore, are of little use to determine whether a note
is a security.4 9 Then, recognizing that they had not previously analyzed
what test applies to note transactions, the Court examined the various tests
that the lower courts created.5° Although the Court acknowledged that the
commercial/investment test is similar to the family resemblance test, the
Court concluded that the Second Circuit's family resemblance test provided
a better framework for analysis."' The Court then applied the family resem-
blance test to the notes in Reves and concluded that the notes were
securities.
5 2
Although the entire Court concurred with the adoption of the family re-
semblance test, four Justices dissented on a separate issue.5 3 Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the dissenters, criticized the majority's application of
the exclusion provided in section 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act for notes with a
maturity of less than nine months.54 The majority reasoned that because the
maturity of a demand note is indeterminate under federal law, the exclusion
must be interpreted in conjunction with the purpose of the Securities Acts.55
47. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 110 S. Ct. at 948; see supra note 12 (discussing identical
scope of definition under the Securities Acts).
48. Id. at 949-51.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 951-52.
51. Id. The Court did not explain why the family resemblance test has a better frame-
work for analysis. See Gordon, Interplanetary Intelligence About Promissory Notes as Securi-
ties, 69 TEX. L. REV. 383, 402 (1990).
52. Reves, at 952.
53. Id. at 957-60 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see infra text
accompanying notes 221-47.
54. Reves at 957. The 1934 Act excludes short-term notes from the definition by
providing:
The term "security" means any note ... but shall not include currency or any
note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a maturity at the time
of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal
thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10). The 1933 Act contains a similar exemption. The 1933 Act exempts
short-term notes from the registration provisions (or filing requirements) of the Act, but short-
term notes are still subject to the antifraud provisions of the 1933 Act. Id. § 77c(a)(3). Conse-
quently, a note with a maturity of nine months or less is not subject to the registration provi-
sions of either act and is covered by the anti-fraud provisions of the 1933 Act only. Id For a
discussion of the short-term note exclusion, see infra text accompanying notes 276-90.
55. Reves, 110 S. Ct. at 955 (majority).
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Because the purpose of the Securities Acts is to prevent fraud and abuse with
respect to all investments,56 the majority interpreted the exclusion not to
cover the demand notes in Reve& "' The dissent, on the other hand, found
the exclusion covered demand notes5" because courts have interpreted these
notes as having an immediate maturity. 59
While the majority and dissent differed with respect to the meaning of the
term "maturity," Justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion, rejected a literal
reading of the section 3(a)(10) exclusion.' Justice Stevens reasoned that the
courts of appeals have unanimously construed that section to exclude only
commercial paper from the definition of a security, and only Congress
should alter such a settled construction.61
This Note first outlines the statutory scheme of the Securities Acts. Next,
this Note examines the development of the definition of a security by track-
ing the various Supreme Court interpretations of the term. Then, this Note
reviews the federal circuit courts' applications of Supreme Court principles
to notes and the various tests the circuit courts designed to determine
whether a note is a security. Next, this Note analyzes Reves v. Ernst &
Young, its impact on previous tests and on the corporate planner, and the
effect on the applicability of the 3(a)(10) exclusion on notes. Finally, the
Note concludes that Reves provides more predictability in identifying which
notes are covered under the Securities Acts, but still leaves the status of
short term notes in question.
I. THE STATUTORY SCHEME OF THE SECURITIES ACTS
After the Crash of 1929, Congress decided to regulate the securities mar-
kets62 and passed the Securities Acts to achieve its goal.6 3 The 1933 Act
56. See supra text accompanying notes 1-7; see also United Housing Found., Inc. v. For-
man, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975) (primary purpose of the Securities Acts was "to eliminate seri-
ous abuses in a largely unregulated securties market"); cf Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S.
551, 556 (1982) (in enacting the securities laws, Congress "did not intend to provide a broad
federal remedy for all fraud").
57. Reves, 110 S. Ct. at 955.
58. Reves, 110 S. Ct. at 958 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
see infra text accompanying notes 239-47.
59. See American Wholesale Corp. v. Bryant, 2 F.2d 31, 32 (5th Cir. 1924); In re Las
Colinas, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 582, 595 (D.P.R. 1968); Peterson v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 102 Ariz.
434, 432 P.2d 446 (1967); Hotel Lanier Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ga. 604, 30 S.E. 558 (1898);
Northcutt v. Massie, 201 Tenn. 638, 301 S.W.2d 355 (1957).
60. Reves, 110 S. Ct. at 955-56 (Stevens, J., concurring).
61. Id.
62. See note I and accompanying text. Section 2 of the 1934 Act provides that the securi-
ties markets are "affected with a national public interest" which necessitates efficient regula-
tion "in order to protect interstate commerce, the national credit, the Federal taxing power, to
protect and make more effective the national banking system and Federal Reserve System, and
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regulates the initial distribution of securities to the public," while the 1934
Act regulates the post-issuance trading of securities.65 The Securities Acts
generally require parties issuing securities to file a disclosure statement with
the Securities and Exchange Commission.6 6 The statement is required to
disclose material information regarding the security and the issuer of the
security so that potential purchasers are able to make informed investment
decisions.67 The provisions of the Securities Acts, however, apply only when
the transaction involves a security.68
The definition of a security in both the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act in-
cludes specific terms such as stocks, bonds, and notes.69 In addition, to cast
a broad net over various transactions, the definition contains catchall
phrases, such as an "investment contract" and "instrument commonly
known as a 'security.' "70 While the Securities Acts' coverage is broad, a
limit placed on the scope of the Securities Acts is that the definition of a
security applies "unless the context otherwise requires."71 An instrument
may seemingly fall within one of the specific or more general terms of the
definition, but a court may find that the instrument is not within the defini-
tion of security after it considers the context of the transaction.7 2 Because
to insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets ...." 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1988). The
operation of securities markets affects the investing public as well as the public at large.
63. See Securities Act of 1933, Ch. 38, § 2(1), 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended 15
U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1988)); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1988)).
64. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa. Such markets are known as the "primary markets."
65. Id §§ 78a-78i. Such markets are known as the "secondary markets."
66. Section 5 of the 1933 Act prohibits the sale of securities without an effective registra-
tion statement. Id. § 78k-l(b). However, the 1933 Act provides numerous exemptions which
permit the trading of securities without a registration statement or with a short-form registra-
tion statement. See, e.g., id §§ 77c-d; 1 T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION
§§ 4.1-4.29 (2d ed. 1990).
67. See supra note 5 (discussing registration).
68. See supra note 12.
69. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1933 Act); id § 78c(a)(10) (1934 Act).
70. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1934 Act); id. § 77b (1933 Act).
71. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a); icL § 77b.
72. See 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(a); id. § 77(b). There is disagreement concerning the meaning
of the "context" clause. Some courts have interepreted the provision as referring to the con-
text of the transaction being considered. See, e.g., Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 558-
59 (1982) (court held that the existence of the federal banking laws that protect purchasers of
bank certificates of deposit was a context that required not finding a security); SEC v. C. M.
Joiner Leasing, 320 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1943) ("courts will construe the details of an act in
conformity with its dominating general purpose, [and] will read text in the light of context
S.. "); Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1137-38 (2d Cir. 1976)
(presumption of family resemblance test may be rebutted if context otherwise requires). Other
courts and commentators suggest that the prefatory language means unless the "text" other-
wise requires. See SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 466 (1969) (in reference to the
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the legislative history of the definition of a security provides little guidance,
the Supreme Court has attempted to outline the scope of the Securities
Acts.
73
II. THE DEFINITION OF SECURITY: A TRACE OF SUPREME
COURT AUTHORITY
In SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 74 the first case interpreting the defi-
nition of a security, the Supreme Court adopted a broad construction of the
Securities Acts."1 In Joiner, the Court recognized that, although an instru-
ment may be deemed a security if it is specifically provided for in the defini-
tion, "the reach of the Act does not stop with the obvious and
commonplace."'7 6 The Court determined that "[n]ovel, uncommon, or irreg-
ular devices" may fall within the definition of a "security" if such devices
can be established as "investment contracts.
7 7
Two years after Joiner, the Court in SEC v. W. J. Howey Co. 78 created the
economic realities test to determine whether an instrument was an invest-
prefatory clause the Court stated, "Congess itself has cautioned that the same words may take
on a different coloration in different sections of the securities laws"); American Bankers Ass'n
v. SEC, 804 F.2d 739, 753 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (context clause does not encompass the considera-
tion of outside circumstances in construing a term defined in the Securities Acts). See gener-
ally Hannan & Thomas, The Importance of Economic Reality and Risk in Defining Federal
Securitiex 25 HASTINGs L.J. 219, 278 (1974) (context clause provides that the plain meaning
of the definition controls unless the language surrounding the term in another statutory section
changes the meaning); Hammett, Any Promissory Note: The Obscene Security--A Search for
the Non-Commerical Investment, 7 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 25, 39 (1975) ("[t]he 'context' referred
to in the prefatory clause to section 3 of the 1934 Act is the context of the statute itself");
Steinberg & Kaulbach, The Supreme Court and the Definition of "Security": The "Context"
Clause, "Investment Contract"Analysis, and Their Ramifications, 40 VAND. L. REV. 489, 504-
12 (1987) (statutory definition controls, regardless of the factual circumstances).
73. See infra text accompanying notes 74-109.
74. 320 U.S. 344 (1934).
75. Id The Court in Joiner was confronted with interests in oil and gas leases coupled
with service agreements. Id. at 345-46. In holding the instruments to be securities, the Court
examined the character of the instrument, the plan of distribution, and the promoter's eco-
nomic inducements held out to the purchaser. Id at 352-53. The Court determined that,
because the purchasers were induced into buying the interests with the expectation of receiving
a share of the profits if oil was discovered, the interests were "investment contracts" and there-
fore securities. Id. at 352.
76. Id at 351.
77. Id.
78. 328 U.S. 293 (1946). The Court confronted whether the sale of units of a citrus grove
coupled with a service contract was a transaction involving a security. Id at 295. The SEC
instituted the action claiming that the W. J. Howey Company violated section 5(a) of the 1933
Act by failing to register the instruments involved in the transaction. Id at 294. The district
court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals treated each instrument as a separate transaction
and held that the instruments were not securities, but instead were instruments involved in an
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ment contract and therefore a security.7 9 Instead of analyzing the form of
the instrument, the Court looked to the economic reality of the transac-
tion.8 o Consistent with Joiner's expansive reading, the Court emphasized
that an economic realities test "embodies a flexible rather than a static prin-
ciple, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable
schemes."'" Under the economic realities test, an instrument is an invest-
ment contract if it is a "contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person
invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely
from the efforts of [others]." 2
The Howey Court created the economic realities test to determine whether
instruments that were not specifically enumerated in the definition of a se-
curity were regulated securities. In United Housing Foundation v. Forman, 3
on the other hand, the Court addressed whether an instrument that is la-
beled "stock" is automatically regulated under the Securities Acts because it
is specifically listed.84 In Forman, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected a
literal reading of the Securities Acts"5 and applied a two step analysis to hold
ordinary real estate transaction that was accompanied by a separate service agreement. Id at
297-98.
79. Id. at 298.
80. Id
81. Id at 299.
82. Id. at 298-99. Although the economic realities and the substance-over-form principles
of Howey have rarely been challenged, the individual elements in the Howey test have under-
gone considerable scrutiny and refinement. For example, the circuit courts disagree over the
scope of "common enterprise." The Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits look for horizontal
commonality that generally requires that the investors' funds be pooled and that the return of
each investor must depend on the success of the entire venture. The Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits use a vertical commonality test which defines common enterprise as "one in
which the fortunes of the investor are interwoven with and dependent upon the efforts and
success of those seeking the investment or third parties." Sec v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.,
497 F.2d 473, 478 (5th Cir. 1975) (citing SEC v. Glen W. Turner Enters., 474 F.2d 476, 482
n.7 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973); see also Gordon, supra note 51, at 387 (proper
test for determining whether a common enterprise is present is a multiplicity test which defines
the term as a profit-seeking venture with multiple parallel investors). The "profits" element
has also undergone some refinement. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439
U.S. 551, 561-62 (1979) (the "expectation of profits" element requires that the profits be de-
rived from the efforts of others and cannot be insubstantial or too speculative); United Housing
Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852-53 (1974) (defining profits as capital appreciation
resulting from development of the initial investment or a participation in earnings resulting
from the use of investors' funds); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482
(9th Cir.) (requirement that profits come "'solely' from the efforts of others" permits insignifi-
cant efforts by the investor), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
83. 421 U.S. 837 (1974).
84. Id.
85. Id at 848. The Court relied on the principle set forth in Howey that form should be
disregarded for substance when searching for the meaning and scope of "security." Id. The
Court stated: "We reject at the outset any suggestion that the present transaction, evidenced by
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that a stock which entitles a purchaser to lease a state subsidized apartment
is not a security.
8 6
First, the Court examined the instrument to determine whether it pos-
sessed characteristics "traditionally associated with stock.""7 If so, it would
fall within the "ordinary concept of a security" and be a regulated instru-
ment.88 The instrument in Forman failed the traditional security test be-
cause the stock granted no right to dividends, was not negotiable, could not
be pledged, conferred no voting rights in proportion to the number of shares
owned, and could not appreciate in value.8 9 Therefore, although the instru-
ment in Forman was labled "stock," the Court held that it was not a security
for purposes of the Securities Acts.90 Even though the stock did not satisfy
the traditional security test, the Court also analyzed whether the instrument
was an investment contract under the Howey test.9 The Court held that the
stock was not a security under the Howey test because the payments of inter-
est and the resulting tax deduction could not satisfy the profit element of the
Howey test.92
the sale of shares called 'stock,' must be considered a security transaction simply because the
statutory definition of a security includes the words 'any... stock.'" Id (footnote omitted).
86. Id at 837. The case centered around the massive cooperative housing project in New
York City called "Co-op City." Id. at 840. The project housed approximately 50,000 people
and was designed to provide low-income urban housing. Id. The United Housing Foundation
(UHF), a nonprofit corporation, was responsible for initiating and sponsoring the development
of the cooperative. Id. UHF organized the Riverbay Corporation, which issued the stock to
operate the land and buildings of Co-op City. Id at 841. To acquire an apartment, the pro-
spective purchasers were required to buy 18 shares of stock for $25 each for each room desired.
Id at 842. The shares were not transferable and had no voting rights. Id If a tenant wished
to move out, he was required to offer the stock back to Riverbay at the original price. Id In
its information bulletin for prospective purchasers, there was also estimated a monthly rental
charge of $23.02 per room to finance a portion of the project. Id at 843. Subsequently, the
costs of the project increased, as did the monthly rental charge (to $39.68). Id at 843-44. The
increase precipitated the suit alleging violations of the antifraud provisions of the 1933 Act for
failure to disclose several critical facts. Id. at 844.
87. Id. at 851; see infra text accompanying note 89 (listing the characteristics of tradi-
tional stock).
88. Forman, 421 U.S. at 851.
89. Id
90. Id.
91. Id at 851-52. Applying Howey, the Court clarified the profits element of the Howey
test by defining profit as capital appreciation resulting from development of the initial invest-
ment or a participation in earnings resulting from the use of investors' funds. Id at 852.
92. Id. at 855. The Court also rejected the idea that the substantially lower cost of renting
an apartment through the Co-op constituted profits. Id The Court reasoned that such a
benefit cannot be converted into cash and does not result from the efforts of others. Id After
Forman, the Supreme Court addressed whether a certificate of deposit (CD) and a separate
business agreement were securities under the 1934 Act. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551
(1982). In Marine Bank the Supreme Court relied on the "context otherwise requires" lan-
guage preceding the definition of a security in section 3(aX 10) to determine that the CD and
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Prior to Forman, the Court had emphasized the need to examine the eco-
nomic realities of a transaction. Indeed, the Court in Forman recognized
that "[b]ecause securities transactions are economic in character Congress
intended the application of these statutes to turn on the economic realities
underlying a transaction."9 3 The traditional security test in Forman's analy-
sis, however, signaled a retreat from the economic realities principle by ex-
amining the character of the instrument rather than the economic realities of
the transaction. In Forman, the Court examined the economic realities of
the transaction only after the instrument failed the traditional securities test.
After Forman, it was unclear whether or not an examination of the eco-
nomic realities under Howey was required when the status of an instrument
as a security was in question.94
In Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 9- the Court, recognizing that its pre-
vious tests had not been clear, attempted to clarify the test which should be
applied in determining whether an instrument was a security. 96 The instru-
ment in Landreth was also labeled "stock." 97 The Supreme Court held that
"[i]nstruments that bear both the name and all of the usual characteristics of
stock seem to us to be the clearest case for coverage by the plain language of
the definition,",98 making it unnecessary to examine the economic reality of
the agreement were not securities. Id. at 558-59. The Court held that because the federal
banking laws and federal insurance plans eliminated investor risk, the context of the transac-
tion in Marine Bank required that the instrument not fall within the scope of the Securities
Acts. Id. The elimination of risk proved dispositive because if the transaction was sufficiently
protected under the federal banking laws, then the transaction was outside the protective scope
of the securities laws. Id. The Court cited to its decision in International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979), where the Court held that a noncontributory,
noncompulsory pension plan was not a security partially because the instrument was already
regulated by Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). Marine Bank, 455 U.S. at
558-59. The Marine Bank Court also found that the agreement was not a security. Id. at 560.
In Marine Bank, the Weavers pledged the CD to secure a loan for a company and the com-
pany agreed to pay the Weavers a share of the profits in return. Id. at 553. The Court ruled
that, because the agreement was a private transaction and not publicly traded, it was not a
security. Id. at 560.
93. Forman, 421 U.S. at 849.
94. One commentator noted that after the Forman decision, "[t]he difficulty in determin-
ing whether a note is security is no longer fairly great. It is immense.... [W]e now know that
no 'note, stock, etc.' is a security unless it is also an investment contract. Defining 'security' is
now as easy as defining pornography." Hammett, supra note 72, at 25-26.
95. 471 U.S. 681 (1985).
96. Id. at 688.
97. Id. The parties entered into a stock purchase agreement for all of the stock of Lan-
dreth Timber. Id. at 683. The lumber business did not live up to the purchaser's expectations
and the purchaser sold the company at a loss. Id. at 684. The purchaser then filed suit against
Landreth, the seller, alleging that he violated the registration and antifraud provisions of the
1933 Act. Id
98. Id at 693.
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the transaction.99 Therefore, while the Court in Landreth embraced the
traditional security test of Forman, " it implicitly limited its holding to in-
struments labeled stock, noting that stock is distinguishable from all the
other listed categories of instruments.' The Court reasoned that an inves-
tor justifiably assumes that a sale of stock is covered by the Securites Acts,
but that the same could not be said for any other type of instrument.
10 2
The holding in Landreth Timber limited the scope of the Howey test by
determining that the economic realities are examined only if the instrument
did not pass the traditional security test."°3 The Court refused to address
whether the traditional security test was applicable to other listed instru-
ments.10' However, the Court acknowledged that notes are used in both
commerical and investment contexts, implying the difficulty that might oc-
cur if it were to use the traditional security analysis for notes."0 5
99. Id at 692-93. In its holding, the Landreth Timber Court rejected the sale of busi-
ness doctrine. Landreth Timber had relied upon the sale of business doctrine to argue that the
transaction did not involve a security and, therefore, was not covered under the 1933 Act. Id
at 684. The sale of business doctrine requires that if the economic reality of the transaction is
the sale of a business to one who will manage it, rather than a mere disposition of stock, the
transfer of the stock is incidental to the sale of the business and is not a transaction involving a
security. R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 5, at 260-61 (discussing Ruefenacht v.
O'Halloran, 737 F.2d 320 (3d Cir. 1984), aff'd sub nom. Gould v. Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701
(1985)). The district court applied the doctrine to the transaction to hold that it was a com-
mercial venture rather than an investment because the purchaser took over the managerial
control. See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 731 F.2d 1348, 1351 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 471
U.S. 681 (1985). The Supreme Court's rejection of the sale of business doctrine settled the
disagreement among the lower courts. Prior to Landreth, the Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits adhered to the sale of business doctrine. See, e.g., Landreth Timber, 731 F.2d at 1348;
Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197, 202 (7th Cir. 1982); Kaye v. Pawnee Constr. Co., 680 F.2d
1360, 1366 n.2 (11th Cir. 1982). The Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits re-
jected it. See, e.g., Ruefenacht v. O'Halloran 737 F.2d 320 (3d Cir. 1984), aff'd sub nom.
Gould v. Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701 (1985); Daily v. Morgan, 701 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1983);
Cole v. PPG Indus., Inc., 680 F.2d 549 (8th Cir. 1982); Coffin v. Polishing Machines, Inc., 596
F.2d 1202, 1204 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979). See generally Easley, Recent
Developments in the Sale-of-Business Doctrine: Toward a Transactional Context-Based Analysis
for Federal Securities Jurisdiction, 39 Bus. LAW. 929 (1984) (supporting sale-of-business doc-
trine as consistent with Supreme Court precedent); Seldin, When Stock Is Not a Security. The
"Sale of Business" Doctrine Under the Federal Securities Laws, 37 Bus. LAW. 637 (1982) (ex-
amining cases which uphold and reject the sale of business doctrine).
100. Landreth Timber, 471 U.S. at 691.
101. Id. at 693-694.
102. Id. at 693. The Court noted that "traditional stock 'represents to many people, both
trained and untrained in business matiers, the paradigm of a security.'" Id. (citing Daily v.
Morgan, 701 F.2d 496, 500 (5th Cir. 1983)).
103. Id at 690; see Jones, Footnote 11 of Marine Bank v. Weaver: Will Unconventional
Certificates of Deposit Be Held Securities?, 24 Hous. L. REv. 491, 512 (1987) (the Court's
"restriction of the Howey test curtails the scope of the securities laws").
104. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 694.
105. Id.
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The common thread among a number of the Court's post-Howey decisions
was the need to examine the economic realities of the transaction rather than
the form of the instrument to determine whether that instrument was a
security. The Howey test was, in effect, synonymous with an economic reali-
ties approach and, therefore, was perceived as the universal test for deter-
mining whether the instrument was regulated under the Securities Acts."16
As the Landreth Court noted, however, all of the cases in which the Court
had employed an economic realities test involved unusual instruments that
were not easily characterized as securities.' °7 When the Court was con-
fronted with traditional stock, an instrument specifically enumerated in the
definition, it applied a traditional security test.'1 8 When the Court applied
the traditional security test, it did not examine the economic realities of the
transaction but instead limited its analysis to the characteristics of the in-
strument."°9 Although the Court refused to address whether the same anal-
ysis could apply to notes or one of the other listed categories, it became
apparent that while the Howey test would apply to uncommon instruments,
other listed categories of instruments needed separate tests.
III. ARE NOTES SECURITIES? CIRCUIT COURT METHODOLOGY
Although the Court had examined the contours of the definition of a se-
curity, it never applied the definition to notes. In the absence of Supreme
Court authority on note transactions, the circuit courts established their own
methodology for determining the Securities Acts' coverage for notes. The
circuits have created three tests to determine the status of notes under the
Securities Acts: the commercial/investment test,'' 0 the risk capital test,"'
and the family resemblance test.' 12 Although each of these tests has a differ-
ent conceptual focus, their outcomes are often the same."13
106. The Forman Court noted that the Howey test was the basic test for distinguishing a
transaction involving a security from a commercial dealing and that it "embodie[d] the essen-
tial attributes that run through all of the Court's decisions defining a security." United Hous-
ing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975).
107. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 690.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See infra text accompanying notes 114-39.
11!. See infra text accompanying notes 140-55.
112. See infra text accompanying notes 156-80.
113. Futura Dev. Corp. v. Centex Corp., 761 F.2d 33, 40 (Ist Cir.) (the conceptual basis of
the three tests and the factors examined by the courts tend to be very similar although the
focus is slightly different), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 850 (1985); see also American Bank & Trust
Co. v. Wallace, 702 F.2d 93, 95 (6th Cir. 1983) (court suggests that although the circuits are
split with respect to which analysis is appropriate, the results reached under the tests are virtu-
ally identical); Home Guar. Ins. Corp. v. Third Fin. Servs., Inc., 667 F. Supp. 577 (M.D.
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A. The Commercial/Investment Test
A majority of the federal circuits have adopted the commercial/invest-
ment test for determining whether a note is a security." 4 Under this test,
courts distinguish between notes of an investment nature and notes of a com-
mercial nature.'1 5 Only notes that are investment in nature are considered
securities and are subject to federal securities regulation. 1 6 In making the
distinction, the courts have deliniated a number of factors to examine the
economic context of the transaction." 17
In McClure v. First National Bank of Lubbock, Texas,"" the court applied
the commercial/investment test to a promissory note and deed of trust given
by a corporation to secure a loan from a bank." 9 McClure, a fifty percent
controlling shareholder of a corporation, consented to a loan evidenced by a
note based on representations made by the bank and Hanslik, the other fifty
percent shareholder, that the proceeds were necessary to pay corporate obli-
gations.' 20 Hanslik subsequently used the proceeds from the loan to repay
his personal debts. McClure brought suit against Hanslik, the bank, and the
loan officer of the bank alleging violations of the 1934 Act.' 2 '
The court identified three factors that, when considered together, would
establish the note as a security. 122 The court considered whether the note
Tenn. 1987) (holding that mortgage notes were not securities under the Howey test, risk capital
test, commercial/investment test or the family resemblance test).
The D.C. Circuit has applied the Howey test, supra text accompanying notes 78-82, to notes
to determine whether the instrument was a security. In Baurer v. Planning Group, Inc., 669
F.2d 770 (D.C. Cir. 1981), the D.C. Circuit sought to determine whether a promissory note
given in exchange for funds advanced to form a limited partnership was a security. 669 F.2d at
772. The court examined the statutory definitions of a security in both Securities Acts and
found that whether a note is a security depends on whether the instrument is an investment as
opposed to a commercial note. Id. at 775-76. Although the court noted that the courts of
appeals have devised several tests to determine whether a note is a security, the court found
that the Howey test "endorsed the long-standing definition of 'investment.'" Id. at 778.
Under the Howey test, the court found that the terms of the agreement, in which Baurer ad-
vanced money in reliance on the managerial skills of the defendants to establish a profitmaking
organization, indicate the investment character of the note. Id.
114. See supra note 24 (circuit courts using commercial/ investment test).
115. See supra note 24.
116. See Futura Dev. Corp., 761 F.2d at 40; Hunssinger v. Rockford Business Credits, Inc.,
745 F.2d 484, 488 (7th Cir. 1984); Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank, 495 F.2d 1109, 1112-13 (5th Cir.
1974); Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546, 551 (10th Cir. 1974); Lino v. City Investing Co., 487
F.2d 689, 691 (3d Cir. 1973).
117. See infra notes 118-134.
118. 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975).
119. Id. at 491.
120. Id. at 491-92.
121. Id. at 492.
122. Id. at 493.
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was: offered to some class of investors, purchased for speculation or invest-
ment purposes, and offered in exchange for a type of investment asset.123 If
these criteria were met, according to the court, it would indicate the note
was an investment and therefore a security. 124 In McClure, the court ruled
that the note was not a security because it was not publicly offered and be-
cause the note actually operated as a loan rather than an investment asset. 125
In Futura Development Corp. v. Centex Corp., '26 the First Circuit consid-
ered whether a promissory note issued as partial payment for a tract of land
and secured by a mortgage on the property was a security. 12' Futura Devel-
opment Corporation sold a tract of land to a subsidiary of Centex Corpora-
tion in return for cash, a promissory note secured by a mortgage, and an
assumption of a mortgage that Futura had previously taken on the land.' 2s
When Centex's subsidiary defaulted on the note, Futura brought suit claim-
ing violations of the antifraud provisions of the Securities Acts.129 Centex
argued that the promissory note was not a security within the protection of
the Securities Acts. 3 o
In applying the commercial/investment test, the court identified several
factors, in addition to those listed in McClure, that it deemed relevant in
distinguishing investment notes from commercial notes.' 3 ' Specifically, the
court looked to the size of the offering, reliance by the purchaser on the
efforts of the issuer, the purposes of both parties in entering the transaction,
and the economic inducements held out to the purchaser. 1 32 Because the
note in Futura was the result of one-on-one business negotiations and was
123. Id. at 493-94. Although the court noted that the first two factors usually indicate
investment overtones, the court stated that other factors may be considered. Id. at 493 n.2
(citing Comment, supra note 15, at 510-524). The factors that the author suggests are: the
public's expectations, the issuer's use of the proceeds, the risk of the transaction, the number of
notes issued, the dollar amount of the transaction, the maturity of the note, and the characteri-
zation of the notes on the issuer's financial statements. Comment, supra note 15, at 510-24.
124. McClure, 497 F.2d at 493.
125. Id. at 493-94.
126. 761 F.2d 33 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 850 (1985).
127. Id. at 36.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 36-37. Futura alleged that Centex made fraudulent representations regarding
their intentions to purchase the entire tract of land which would violate section 10b of the 1934
Act. Id at 38.
130. Id
131. Id. at 41.
132. Id (citing Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 556 (1982). The court also noted
other factors that have been given consideration:
[T]he degree to which the profit on the note is in the hands of the maker rather than
the payee; whether the object of the holder was to acquire an interest in the property
or enterprise; whether the note was primarily commercial because it was serving as a
"cash substitute" for the purchase price; and whether the return on the note was
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for a definite amount with a predetermined interest rate, the court held that
the note was a substitute for the sales price of the land and not dependent on
the efforts of Centex.133 Accordingly, the court found the note to be com-
mercial in nature and not a regulated security.1
3 4
The commercial/investment test is consistent with the Supreme Court's
rulings that the economic realities of the transaction and not the form of the
transaction should determine whether an instrument is a security. 135 Some
commentators and courts, however, complain that the commercial/invest-
ment test leads to inconsistent results. 136  Further, while the language of
section 3(a)(10) would cover all notes unless the context otherwise re-
quired,137 the commercial/investment test presumes that the Securities Acts
do not cover notes unless their investment nature is shown. 138 Therefore,
the commercial/investment test places the burden of proof on the party as-
serting coverage under either of the Securities Acts to demonstrate the note
was for investment purposes. 
139
predetermined or could reasonably be anticipated, or was subject to the managerial
efforts of the maker.
Id. (citing C.N.S. Enters., Inc. v. G. & G. Enters., Inc., 508 F.2d 1354, 1360-62 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975)).
Other circuits that have employed the commercial/investment test have added to the First
Circuit's list of relevant factors. See, e.g., Hunssinger v. Rockford Business Credits, Inc., 745
F.2d 484, 493 (7th Cir. 1984) (where the court held that the solicitation of the general public
seeking a passive return and the sale to them of units of a large offering are the hallmarks of an
investment).
133. Futura, 761 F.2d at 41-42.
134. Id at 42. The court did not indicate whether one factor could be dispositive or
whether, in all cases, a balancing approach must be performed. The court, however, did em-
phasize that the focus of the commercial/investment test is on the investor's dependency on
the efforts of others. Id. at 40-41. In Futura, the note had a fixed interest rate and was for a
definite amount. Id. at 41. The value of the note was "in no way dependent upon the en-
trepreneurial efforts" of others. Id Consequently, under Futura, the dependency of the inves-
tor on the issuer of the note may be heavily weighted or dispositive. See also Emisco Indus.,
Inc. v. Pro's, Inc., 543 F.2d 38, 40-41 (7th Cir. 1976) (a note given as partial consideration for
the purchase of business assets was not a security because of the lack of reliance on a third
party); C.N.SEntern, 508 F.2d at 1362 (notes used to purchase small business were not securi-
ties because note was a cash substitute and therefore there was no dependency on the efforts of
others).
135. The court in Futura noted that the commercial/investment test was "more or less
employed in spirit" in the Supreme Court's ruling in Forman, as it undoubtedly is in most of
the Supreme Court's rulings which emphasize the economic realities of the transaction.
Futura, 761 F.2d at 40.
136. See, e.g., Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1136 (2d Cir.
1976); C.N.S. Enters, 508 F.2d at 1359; Oliver v. Bostetter, 426 F. Supp 1082, 1085 (D. Md.
1977); Gordon, supra note 51, at 387.
137. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
138. Futura, 761 F.2d at 40.
139. See id.
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B. The Risk Capital Analysis
Although a majority of the circuits apply the commercial/investment test,
the Ninth and Sixth Circuits determine whether a note is a security based on
whether risk capital"4 has been contributed subject to the entrepreneurial or
managerial efforts of another.' This risk capital approach is consistent
with the economic realities principle announced in Howey because it exam-
ines the context of the transaction rather than the form of the instrument.'
42
The test differs from the economic realities test, however, because it focuses
on the relationship of the parties to the transaction rather than on the char-
acterization of the instrument as an investment. 143
In Great Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz, ' an early case applying the risk
capital test, a corporation issued an unsecured short-term note to Great
Western Bank in exchange for a line of credit. 45 When the corporation
later defaulted on the note and declared bankruptcy, Great Western brought
suit against Kotz, the president of the corporation, to recover its losses."
To determine whether the transaction involved a security, the court ana-
lyzed whether the funding party, Great Western, invested risk capital subject
to the managerial efforts of the corporation. 47 Specifically, the court deter-
mined whether the purchaser sufficiently risked his capital by considering
the time of maturity of the note, collateralization of the note, form of the
obligation, circumstances of its issuance, relationship between the amount
borrowed and the size of the borrower's business, and the intended use of the
proceeds. 4 ' The court held that Great Western had not invested risk capi-
140. The court recognized that a "risk" inquiry is difficult:
In one sense every lender of money is an investor since he places his money at risk in
anticipation of a profit in the form of interest. Also in a broad sense every investor
lends his money to a borrower who uses it for a price and is expected to return it one
day.
Great Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1257 (9th Cir. 1976) (quoting C.N.S.
Enters., 508 F.2d at 1359).
141. Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. Commercial Credit Business Loans, Inc., 651 F.2d
1174, 1182 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1124 (1981); Great Western, 532 F.2d. at 1257.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 78-82.
143. See Comment, When Is a Note a Security?, 18 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 757, 768
(1978). See generally, Note, The Economic Realities of Defining Notes as Securities Under the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 400, 414
(1982) (risk capital test judges the economic realities by focusing on relationship of the lender
and borrower).
144. 532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976).
145. Id. at 1254.
146. Id. at 1253.
147. Id. at 1256-60.
148. Id. at 1257-58. The court also noted that no single factor is determinative and that
other fact patterns may require an inquiry into other factors. Id. at 1258.
[Vol. 40:711
To Be or Note to Be a Security
tal dependent on the efforts of the corporation. 149 The court emphasized the
significance of the note's time of maturity and held that a demand or short-
term note is almost "ipso facto not a security unless payment is dependent
upon the success of a risky enterprise." 5 ' The court reasoned that because
the bank maintained significant control over the corporation,' 5 ' any risk be-
yond the risk normally associated with commercial lending had been
eliminated.' 5 2
Several commentators have supported the risk capital test as the method
to define an instrument as a security. They argue that risk is an important
factor that distinguishes securities from commercial transactions.' 5 3 Like-
wise, one commentator has criticized the test noting that risk depends on the
obligor's financial standing rather than a function of the transaction. '4 Fi-
nally, similar to the commercial/investment test, the risk capital test also
presumes an instrument is not covered by the Securities Acts and places the
burden of proof on the party asserting coverage under either of the Securities
The Ninth Circuit adhered to this approach in later cases and similarly applied the six
factors established in Great Western. See Amfac Mortgage Corp. v. Arizona Mall of Tempe,
Inc., 583 F.2d 426, 432 (9th Cir. 1978) (involving an institutional lender who made a single
loan agreement with a business); United Cal. Bank v. THC Fin. Corp., 557 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir.
1977) (same).
149. Great Western, 532 F.2d at 1260. Although the note in Great Western was unsecured,
the accompanying loan agreement placed several limitations on Artko. Id. at 1254-55. The
agreement demanded that Artko maintain a minimum balance of at least $300,000, that it
maintain working capital of at least $4,000,000, that it engage in no further unsecured loans,
and that Great Western could declare default or renegotiate if signs of insecurity were to arise.
Id. Thus, these factors gave the bank considerable control over Artko and the bank did not
contribute risk capital. Id. at 1259-60.
150. Id. at 1257.
151. See supra note 149.
152. Great Western, 532 F.2d at 1259-60.
153. See Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security"- Is There a More Meaningful
Formula?, 18 CASE W. RES. 367, 381-96 (1967); Long, An Attempt to Return "Investment
Contracts" to the Mainstream of Securities Regulation, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 135, 167-70 (1971);
Hannan & Thomas, supra note 72, at 241-249; Comment, supra note 15, at 513-14. The
Supreme Court, however, refused to adopt a risk capital analysis in United Housing Found.,
Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 857, n.24 (1975). The Court's refusal to adopt the test was
actually circular in reasoning. Its reasoning was based on the fact that the purchasers of the
apartments in the co-operative take no risk, from which it followed that the risk capital test
could not be applied. Id. The risk of insolvency that the respondents in Forman mentioned
"'differs vastly' from the kind of risk of 'fluctuating' value associated with securities invest-
ments." Id. (quoting SEC v. Variable Annuity Co., 359 U.S. 65, 90-91 (1959) (Brennan, J.,
concurring)).
154. See Sonnenschein, supra note 24, at 1595 1601. If the lender shoulders most of the
risk, the borrower's risk consequently diminishes. See id. Because coverage depends on the
proportion of risk allocated to the parties, the status of the lender's note varies inversely with
the status of the borrower's note. See id. This inconsistency severely undermines the value of
the risk capital test in determing whether a note is a security.
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Acts to show that risk capital was contributed subject to the efforts of
others.'55
C. Family Resemblance Test
In Exchange National Bank v. Touche, Ross & Co., 156 the Second Circuit
created yet another test, the family resemblance test, to apply in determining
whether a note is a security. Relying on a literal reading of section 2(1) of
the 1933 Act, 157 the court established a rebuttable presumption that all notes
with a term of more than nine months are securities.' Unlike the commer-
cial/investment and risk capital tests, the family resemblance test presumes
notes are covered and places the burden of proof on the party wishing to
rebut that presumption.' 59 The party can rebut the presumption by showing
that the instrument bears a "strong family resemblance" to an instrument
that the court has deemed is clearly not a security."
Exchange National Bank involved the purchase of three unsecured
subordinated notes from Weiss Securities Inc., a brokerage firm and member
of the New York Stock Exchange.' 6 ' The notes became worthless after
Weiss went into receivership and defaulted on the notes.' 62 Exchange Na-
tional Bank brought suit under the Securities Acts against Touche Ross, the
accountant who prepared the financial statements for the transaction, alleg-
ing false and misleading entries.' 63 Touche Ross filed a motion to dismiss
for want of subject matter jurisdiction claiming that the notes were not se-
curities and therefore were not subject to securities regulation."M
155. See Great Western, 532 F.2d at 1253.
156. 544 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1976). Two cases that preceded Exchange Nat7 Bank also
adopted a literal approach to the Securities Acts. Exchange Nat') Bank, however, is credited
for establishing the current family resemblance test. The first case was Movielab, Inc. v. Ber-
key Photo, Inc., 452 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1971), which involved a sale of assets by defendant
corporation in exchange for two twenty-year notes by plaintiff corporation. The court read the
statute literally to encompass the transaction. Id. at 663. The second case involved a parent
corporation forcing its subsidiary into a loan evidenced by a demand note which was found to
be a security. Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795, 799 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 908 (1973).
157. See infra note 166.
158. Exchange Nat7 Bank, 544 F.2d at 1137-38.
159. Id
160. Id. at 1138.





To Be or Note to Be a Security
After expressing dissatisfaction with both the risk capital test and com-
mercial/investment tests,' 65 the Second Circuit noted that the "best alterna-
tive... may lie in greater recourse to the statutory language."' " The court
examined section 2(1) and adopted the plain meaning of the statute to create
a presumption of coverage of all notes with a term of more than nine
months.' 67 The court made clear that the presumption may be rebutted if
the party seeking to avoid coverage can prove that the "context otherwise
requires" finding the note to be a security.' 68 The court illustrated six in-
stances, or contexts, that it deemed were obvious commercial notes and thus
not securities. 169 The court concluded that, unless the note "bear[s] a strong
family resemblance" to one of these six examples of non-securities provided,
all notes with a maturity of more than nine months' 70 are covered under the
Securities Acts.'
7 1
The six illustrations created in Exchange National Bank that may rebut
the presumption, however, are not exclusive. In Chemical Bank v. Arthur
Andersen & Co., 172 the Second Circuit considered whether a replacement
note which evidenced loans made by a commercial bank to finance current
165. Id. at 1135-37. The court noted that "[d]irecting district courts to 'weigh' a number
of such dubious factors, without any instructions as to relative weights... is scarcely helpful."
Id. at 1137.
166. L at 1137. The statutory language of section 2(l) of the 1933 Act reads: "[Unless
the context otherwise requires . . . [tihe term 'security' means any note ... but shall not
include.., any note... which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine
months." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(aX1O) (1988).
167. Exchange Nat'! Bank 544 F.2d at 1137. The court recognized that "this approach
does not afford complete certainty but it adheres more closely to the language of the statutes
and it may be somewhat easier to apply then the weighing and balancing of recent decisions of
sister circuits." Id. at 1138.
168. Id. But see supra note 72 (discussing the meaning of the context clause).
169. Exchange Nat'! Bank 544 F.2d at 1138. The examples stated were: consumer financ-
ing notes, notes secured by home mortgages, short-term notes secured by a lien on a small
business or its assets, notes evidencing a character loan to a bank customer, short-term notes
secured by an assignment of accounts receivable, or notes formalizing an open-account debt
incurred in the ordinary course of business. Id; see also Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen &
Co., 726 F.2d 930, 939 (2d Cir.) (adding to the list "notes evidencing loans by commercial
banks for current operations"), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 884 (1984).
170. Exchange Nat'! Bank 544 F.2d at 1138. The presumption only exists if the note has a
maturity of nine months or more because of the statutory exclusion in the definition. Id. at
1137-38. The family resemblance test recognizes the exemption whereas the commercial/in-
vestment test has been viewed as essentially writing the exclusion out of the law. See McClure
v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490, 495 (5th Cir. 1974) ("the investment or commercial nature
of a note entirely controls the applicability of the Act, depriving of all utility the exemption
based on maturity-length"). Id
171. Exchange Nat'!Bank, 544 F.2d at 1138. The court left "for another day" the status of
a note that has a maturity of nine months or less and does not bear a strong family resem-
blance to a listed non-security. Id at 1138 n.19.
172. 726 F.2d 930 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 469 U.S. 884 (1984).
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operations of a borrower was a security. 173 After acknowledging that Ex-
change National Bank did not list replacement notes, the court held that
Exchange National Bank's enumerated list of non-securities was not "graven
in stone."' 174 Accordingly, the court held that the replacement note was not
a security and added it to the list of non-securities.
75
The presumption of coverage in the Second Circuit's family resemblance
test shifts the burden of proving coverage to the party asserting that the note
does not fall within the Securities Acts' protection.176 Further, the family
resemblance test's strength lies in its textual basis and increased predictabil-
ity. '77 The concrete examples of non-securities provide a more workable
framework than an analysis into the various factors that different courts
have articulated for both the commercial/investment and risk capital
tests. '78 Notwithstanding the increased predictability that the examples pro-
vide, commentators have criticized the test for failing to articulate the com-
mon characteristics that distinguish the examples of non-securities from
securities.' 79 Critics have also charged that it is difficult to find a strong
resemblance to those enumerated non-securities without knowing the factors
the court used to distinguish them from securities.' The circuit courts
have been unable to agree on a single test to determine when a note is a
security. Accordingly, when the Court addressed the issue in Reves v. Ernst
& Young, it could have chosen from a variety of tests and factors in crafting
a test to determine whether a note is a security.
IV. REVES V. ERNST & YOUNG: SETTLING THE DISAGREEMENT
AMONG THE CIRCUIT COURTS OVER WHEN A NOTE IS A
SECURITY
In Reves v. Ernst & Young, ' the Supr -me Court adopted the Second
Circuit's family resemblance test and presumed that a note is a security un-
less it bears a strong resemblance to one of the enumerated categories of
173. Id. at 936-39.
174. lId at 939.
175. Id
176. See Exchange Nat'l Bank, 544 F.2d at 1137-38. Although the court did not discuss
the burden of proof, a presumption of coverage implicitly places the burden on the party op-
posing coverage.
177. See, e.g., Note, supra note 143, at 418 (the "concrete examples... provide the predict-
ability that is absent in the investment/commercial and risk capital tests"); Sonnenschein,
supra note 24, at 1603 ("Exchange National Bank represents a step towards greater certainty
and consistency of decision than is available under the other formulations").
178. See supra notes 114-55 and accompanying text.
179. See Comment, supra note 143, at 773.
180. Id.
181. 110 S. Ct. 945 (1990).
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notes that are not securities.'8 2 The Court expanded the Second Circuit's
test, however, by adding factors to help determine whether the note bears a
strong resemblance to a listed non-security. "' If no resemblance to an enu-
merated non-security is found, the Court noted that the same factors may be
examined to determine whether the instrument in question should be added
to the list.'" 4 The Court also held that the demand note in Reves did not fall
within the exclusion in the statute for notes with a maturity of nine months
or less. 8 5 Thus, the presumption of coverage adopted by the Reves Court,
as opposed to the presumption of non-coverage in the other tests, potentially
broadens the scope of the Securities Acts. As judicial precedents develop
and instruments are added to the list of non-securities, however, the Securi-
ties Acts' scope will likely be narrowed. 
8 6
A. The Majority's Analysis
1. Limiting the Howey and Landreth Timber Tests
Both the majority and dissent in Reves accepted the rebuttable presump-
tion of the family resemblance test. 187 The majority first examined a line of
prior Supreme Court opinions that interpreted the definition of a security. '
88
Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, dismissed the application of the
Landreth Timber test to notes. 189 The Court interpreted the Landreth Tim-
ber analysis as a "per se rule" limited to instruments that bear the traditional
characteristics of stock.'t9 Justice Marshall reasoned that because the in-
vesting public's perception of stock as a security is well-grounded, stock is
182. Id. at 952. The Supreme Court's version of the test did not include the language,
"with a term of more than nine months" but instead presumed "al' notes to be securities. Id.
at 951 n.3 (emphasis in original). In a footnote, the Supreme Court attributed this modifica-
tion to its refusal to interpret the exclusion for notes with a maturity of nine months or less.
Id. Instead, the Court chose not to reach the meaning of that exclusion. See infra text accom-
panying notes 221-31 (discussing the exclusion).
183. Reves, 110 S. Ct. at 951-52.
184. Id. Although the factors in Reves did not yet exist, the Second Circuit in Chemical
Bank after finding no resemblance to the non-securities enumerated in Exchange Nat'l Bank
v. Touche, Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1976), added an instrument to the list. Chemi-
cal Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930, 939 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 884
(1984).
185. Reves, 110 S. Ct. at 954-55.
186. See Steinberg, Notes As Securities: Reves and Its Implications, 51 Onto ST. L.J. 675,
684 (1990).
187. Reves, 110 S. Ct. at 952.
188. Id. at 949-50.
189. Id. at 950.
190. Id.
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the "quintessence" of a security and therefore a special case. 91 Justice Mar-
shall recognized that a note, on the other hand, can be employed in either a
consumer context or an investment context and that the public does not
necessarily perceive it as a security.' 92 He then held that because of the
varying contexts in which notes are used, the phrase "any note" in section
3(a)(10) cannot be literally interpreted to mean any note, but instead must be
analyzed against the "backdrop" of what Congress attempted to achieve in
enacting the Securities Acts.
193
Next, Justice Marshall reviewed the various tests the circuits applied to
determine whether a note is a security.' 94 He explicitly rejected the applica-
tion of the Howey test to notes, asserting that the Howey test was designed
solely to determine whether an instrument is an investment contract, not
whether it is among any of the listed categories of securities.' 95 Turning to
the other tests, Justice Marshall recognized that although the family resem-
blance test and the commercial/investment test are similar approaches, the
family resemblance test "provides a more promising framework for analy-
sis.' 19 6 Accordingly, after years of circuit disagreement over how to deter-
mine whether a note is a security, the Court in Reves cleared up the
confusion by adopting the family resemblance test.
191. Id. (citing Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 693 (1985)). Professor
Loss' discussion of whether instruments labeled stocks are securities also supports this
reasoning:
It is one thing to say that the typical cooperative apartment dweller has bought a
home, not a security; or that not every installment purchase "note" is a security; or
that a person who charges a restaurant meal by signing his credit card slip is not
selling a security even though his signature is an "evidence of indebtedness." But
stock (except for the residential wrinkle) is so quintessentially a security as to fore-
close further analysis.
L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURrmES REGULATION 212 (1983) (emphasis in original).
192. Reves, 110 S. Ct. at 950.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 950-51.
195. Id. at 950. Justice Marshall reasoned that "[t]o hold that a 'note' is not a 'security'
unless it meets a test designed for an entirely different variety of instrument 'would make the
Acts' enumeration of many types of instruments superfluous.'" Id at 951 (quoting Landreth
Timber, 471 U.S. at 692). The Court apparently also rejected the risk capital test which it
viewed as a "virtually identical" approach to that taken in the Howey test. Id. at 951 (citing
Underhill v. Royal, 769 F.2d 1426, 1431 (9th Cir. 1985)). In Forman, however, the Court had
rejected a risk capital analysis and adopted the Howey test as a second step of its analysis.
Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 & 857 n.24 (1975); see supra note 153 (discussing Forman's rejec-
tion of the risk capital test).
196. Reves, 110 S. Ct. at 951.
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2. Family Resemblance "Plus"
While the Court settled the disagreement among the circuit courts when it
adopted the family resemblance test, the Court did not stop there. Indeed,
the Supreme Court observed that the test should provide additional gui-
dance. 9 " For example, the Court noted that under the family resemblance
test, courts have difficulty resolving whether an instrument resembles one of
the listed non-securities.' 98 Justice Marshall, therefore, specified four fac-
tors to determine whether an instrument strongly resembles a listed non-
security or whether an instrument should be added to the list: the motiva-
tions of the buyer and seller, the plan of distribution of the instrument, the
public expectation that the instrument is a security, and the existence of a
risk reducing factor.199
First, the Court considered the motivations of the buyer and seller to enter
into the transaction.2'o Justice Marshall reasoned that if the seller's motiva-
tion was to raise money for a business venture or finance an enterprise and
the buyer's motivation was to gain a profit,201 then the note would likely be a
security.2"2 If, however, the seller's motivation was to assist in purchasing a
minor asset or consumer good or to advance some other consumer purpose,
then the note would less likely be deemed a security.20 3 Applying the moti-
vation factor to Reves, the Court noted that the Co-op used the funds to raise
capital and that the investors' motivation in purchasing the notes was the
profit provided by an interest rate that would be adjusted to stay above the
rate paid by banks. 2°' Accordingly, the Court determined that the motiva-
tion factor indicated an investment in a business enterprise rather than a
consumer transaction and therefore was indicative of a security.2 "5
197. Id
198. The courts applying the family resemblance test never enunciated the characteristics
which qualified the listed instruments as non-securities. Id The Court in Reves noted that
"[i]t is impossible to make any meaningful inquiry into whether an instrument bears a 'resem-
blance' to one of the instruments... without specifying what it is about those instruments that
makes them non-'securities.'" Id. (emphasis in original).
199. Id at 951-52.
200. Id The motivation factor was borrowed from the Forman opinion, which refused
Securities Act coverage because the buyer's motivation was to acquire affordable housing, a
commercial purpose, rather than to invest for profit. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 851, 858 (1975).
201. Rees 110 S. Ct. at 951-52. In a footnote, the Court defined profit as "'a valuable
return on an investment,' which undoubtedly includes interest." Id at 952 n.4. The Court,
however, limited this definition of profit to the family resemblance test and refused to extend
the definition of profit to the Howey test. Id
202. Id at 952.
203. Id
204. Id. at 952-53.
205. Id at 953.
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Next, the Court considered the "plan of distribution" of the instrument
and looked to whether the instrument was commonly traded for speculation
or investment purposes. °" If the note was commonly traded, the note
would likely be found a security. Athough "common trading" suggests a
secondary market for the instrument, the Court instead found that the de-
mand notes issued in Reves satisfied the common trading requirement be-
cause they were issued to a "broad segment of the public."2 °7
The Court then turned to the public expectations factor.2"' The Court
indicated that if the public reasonably believed or expected that the instru-
ment was a security, then it may be deemed a security, even where the cir-
cumstances of the transaction suggest that the instrument was not a
security.2"9 As applied to Reves, the public expectation was that the notes
were securities because the advertisements210 characterized the notes as in-
vestments and because no countervailing factors alerted the average investor
to question this characterization.2t
Finally, the Court held that the presence of any risk reducing feature,
such as coverage under other regulations, may result in noncoverage. 2,2 Jus-
tice Marshall reasoned that if there was no risk or only limited risk involved
in purchasing the note, then protection under the Securities Acts would be
23unnecessary. 13 Because the notes in Reves were uninsured and uncollateral-
206. Id. The Court borrowed the plan of distribution factor from SEC v. C. M. Joiner
Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943), the first Supreme Court case interpreting the definition of
a security; cf SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946) (the Court noted that it was
immaterial whether the enterprise was speculative or non-speculative).
207. Reves, 110 S. Ct. at 953. The Court first defined the" 'plan of distribution' " factor as
'common trading for speculation or investment.'" Id. at 952 (quoting C M. Joiner Leasing,
320 U.S. at 351, 353). But the Court then held that the factor was met because the notes were
offered to the general public. Id at 953. Although "trading" implies the existence of a secon-
dary market, the Court apparently did not intend this as a requirement.
208. Id The Court derived the public expectation factor from the Landreth analysis where
it emphasized the investors' justifiable assumption that stock bearing the usual characteristics
of a security falls within the Securities Acts. Id at 952 (citing Landreth Timber, 471 U.S. at
693, 687).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 948. The Co-op marketed the notes including advertisements which read in
part: "'YOUR CO-OP has more than $11,000,000 in assets to stand behind your investments.
The Investment is not Federal [sic] insured but it is... Safe... Secure... and available when
you need it.'" Id (quoting Appendix at 5) (omissions in original).
211. Id at 953.
212. Id. This factor was adopted from Marine Bank which refused coverage of a CD
based solely on the existence of a regulatory body that insured the instruments. Marine Bank
v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 559 (1982). The Court also cited International Brotherhood of Team-
sters v. Daniel in its analysis. 439 U.S. 551, 569-570 (1979) (where regulation under ERISA
was a factor in holding a compulsory, noncontributory pension plan not to be a security).
213. Reves, 110 S. Ct. at 952.
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ized, and no other federal regulation covered the notes, the Court found no
risk reducing factor.214 Accordingly, after considering the motivations of
the buyer and seller, the plan of distribution, the public expectations and
whether there was a risk reducing factor, the Court held that the demand
notes in Reves were securities under the family resemblence "plus" test.215
For the demand note in Reves, the Court's new family resemblance test
proved easily applicable. 16 All the factors were satisfied and the Court pre-
sumed coverage.2t 7 What remained, however, was the exclusion for notes
with a maturity of nine months or less under section 3(a)(10).2"' Because
the notes in Reves were demand notes, Ernst & Young argued that they were
excluded as short-term notes under the 1934 Act.2 19 Although the notes
may have otherwise qualified as securities under Reves' family resemblance
test, their ultimate status under the 1934 Act hinged upon the interpretation
of the exclusion.22°
3. A Literal Application of the Short- Term Note Exclusion
The majority and dissenting opinions differed over the application of the
statutory exclusion for notes with a maturity of nine months or less.22'
Although the weight of authority limits the application of the exclusion to
commercial paper,222 Justice Marshall found it unnecessary to look beyond
214. Id. at 953.
215. Id The Court also dismissed the appellate court's finding that the notes in Reves were
not covered by the Securities Acts because they were demand notes. Id The appellate court
held that demand notes do not have the risk normally associated with a security. Arthur
Young & Co. v. Reves, 856 F.2d 52, 54 (8th Cir. 1988), rev'd sub norm Reves v. Ernst &
Young, 110 S. Ct. 945 (1990). In rejecting the lower court's reasoning, Justice Marshall analo-
gized the risk of a demand note to the instant liquidity of stock, the paradigm security. Id. He
recognized that risk is only eliminated from notes when the note is paid, whereas the risk in
stock is minimized by the availability of the national exchanges. Id He concluded that the
risk inherent in a demand note, therefore, is at least as great as the risk associated with stock.
Id.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 200-15.
217. See id.
218. Reves 110 S. Ct. at 954.
219. Id.
220. See infra text accompanying notes 221-47.
221. Reves, 110 S. Ct. at 954. The 1934 Act excludes notes that have a maturity of nine
months or less from both the reporting and antifraud provisions of that Act. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(aX10) (1988). The 1933 Act, however, only exempts short-term notes from the registra-
tion provisions, not from the antifraud provisions. Id § 77b. Because this case was brought
under section 10b of the 1934 Act, it was necessary for the Court to address the exclusion
under the 1934 Act.
222. See Securities Act Release No. 33-4412, 26 Fed. Reg. 9158 (1961) (the Commission
construed section 3(a)(3) of the 1933 Act exemption to include only prime quality commercial
paper); see also Holloway v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 879 F.2d 772, 778 (10th Cir.
1989) (refusing to read exemption literally, limiting it to prime quality commercial paper), cert.
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the plain meaning of the Securities Acts and therefore gave literal effect to
the statute.22 3 The Court recognized that the Securities Acts clearly exclude
from the definition of a security any note with a maturity of nine months or
less.2 24 Whether the note in Reves fell within the exclusion depended on the
Court's construction of the term maturity in the context of a demand note.
Ernst & Young argued that state statute of limitations determined the ma-
turity of demand notes. 225 Justice Marshall, however, declined to rely on
state law to determine whether a demand note had matured.22 6 The Court
recognized that relying on state law to determine whether an instrument is a
security would result in inconsistent application of the Securities Acts.2 27
Consequently, the Court held that the maturity of notes for purposes of the
Securities Acts is a matter of federal law.228 Under federal law, however, the
maturity of a demand note is indeterminate. 229 The Court concluded, there-
fore, that because the legislative intent of the Securities Acts is to ensure the
protection of all investments from fraud and abuse,2 30 the exclusion did not
apply to the demand notes in Reves.2 a1
denied, Il1 S. Ct. 386 (1990); Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795, 800 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973) (even if a note has a maturity of nine months or less, rule lOb-
5 of the 1934 Act still applies unless the note is commerical paper as described by the SEC
Release); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc., 463 F.2d 1075, 1080 (7th Cir.) ("when Congress
spoke of notes with a maturity not exceeding nine months, it meant commercial paper, not
investment securities"), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009 (1972).
223. Reve, 110 S. Ct. at 954.
224. Id; see 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1988).
225. Reves. 110 S. Ct. at 954. Respondents argued, as did the dissent, that state law has
interpreted that, in the context of the statute of limitations, notes payable on demand have
immediate maturity. See infra text accompanying notes 239-47. Because the maturity of a
demand note is immediate under state law, they argued, it is less than nine months and falls
within the exclusion. Reves, 110 S. Ct at 954.
226. Reves 110 S. Ct. at 954.
227. Id. Justice Marshall predicated that such a holding might result in an instrument
being deemed a security in one state while being excluded in another state. Id.
228. Id
229. Id. at 955. Justice Marshall asserted that "the words of the statute are far from 'plain'
with regard to whether demand notes fall within the exclusion." Id. He then noted:
If it is plausible to regard a demand note as having an immediate maturity because
demand could be made immediately, it is also plausible to regard the maturity of a
demand note as being in excess of nine months because demand could be made many
years or decades into the future.
Id (emphasis in original).
230. See 2 ELLENBERGER & MAHAR, supra note 1; Rep. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1933), reprinted in supra note 2 (quoting Senate Reports discussion of the LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY 1933 Act's goals.
231. Reves, 110 S. Ct. at 954.
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B. The Concurrence: Construing the Nine-Month Exclusion
Justice Stevens concurred with the majority's holding that demand notes
do not fall within the exclusion.232 Instead of relying on a literal reading of
the exclusion, however, Justice Stevens deferred to the weight of authority
that interprets the exclusion as limited to prime quality commercial pa-
per.233 Justice Stevens argued that because the courts of appeals2 34 and the
Securities and Exchange Commission 23 have unanimously rejected a literal
reading of the exemption, only Congress should disturb such a well-settled
236construction.
Justice Stevens also noted that the "context otherwise requires" language
preceding the definition of a security supports a judicial construction that
balances "the facially rigid terms of the nine-month exclusion with the evi-
dent intent of Congress. ' 237 He summarily held that the legislative history
of the exclusion was intended to cover only commercial paper and therefore
the demand notes in Reves did not fall within the nine-month exclusion.238
232. Id at 955-56 (Stevens, J., concurring).
233. Id; see infra notes 285-87. Commercial paper is used by corporations and other busi-
ness entities that need to borrow substantial sums of money for short-term use. It usually is
evidenced by short-term unsecured promissory notes and is generally less expensive than con-
ventional bank loans. The SEC has defined the type of commercial paper that is excluded from
the definition of a security. See infra text accompanying note 286.
234. Reves, 110 S. Ct. at 955-56 (citing Sanders v. John Maureen J. Co., 463 F.2d 1075,
1080 (7th Cir. 1972) (relying on Securities Act Release No. 33-4412, 26 Fed. Res. 9158 (1961),
for the proposition that prime quality commercial paper is excluded, and holding that com-
mercial paper of inferior quality purchased by 42 investors was a security), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1009 (1972)); see Holloway v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 879 F.2d 772, 778 (10th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 386 (1990); Baurer v. Planning Group, Inc., 669 F.2d 770,
775-77 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795, 800 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973).
235. Reves, 110 S. Ct. at 956 (citing Securities Act Release No. 33-4412, 26 Fed. Reg.
9158 (1961) (construing § 3(a)(3) of the 1933 Act, the counterpart to § 3(aXlO) of the 1934
Act)).
236. Reves, 110 S. Ct. at 956. Justice Stevens noted: " '[A ]fter a statute has been construed,
either by this Court or by a consistent course of decision by other federal judges and agencies,
it acquires a meaning that should be as clear as if the judicial gloss had been drafted by the
Congress itself." Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Shearson/
American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 268 (1987)).
237. Id at 957 (citing Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche, Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1132-
33 (2d Cir. 1976)).
238. Id Justice Stevens failed to cite the legislative history that he relied on but instead
cited Sanders, 463 F.2d at 1079, which relied on Securities Act Release No. 33-4412. See infra
text accompanying note 286. An examination of the legislative history, however, does reveal
Congress' concern for exempting commercial paper. See, e.g.. S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st
Sess. 4 (1933), reprinted in 2 ELLENBERGER & MAHAR, supra note 1, at item 17 ("It is not
intended under the bill to require the registration of short-time [sic] commercial paper which,
as is the usual practice, is made to mature within a few months and ordinarily is not advertised
for sale to the general public."); H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1933), reprinted in
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C. The Dissent: Demand Notes Have Immediate Maturity
In his dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist2 39 also followed a literal approach
to the exclusion but instead relied on the common understanding of the term
"maturity."" The Chief Justice countered the majority's assertion that
state law is not controlling by noting that, in the absence of federal law, the
Court depends on the contemporaneous meaning of the words at the time
the statute was enacted."' The majority of state courts at the time of enact-
ment of the Securities Acts had established that demand notes had immedi-
ate maturity,24 2 bringing the notes in Reves within the exclusion.24 3
Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that the proposed language in the legisla-
tive history on which Justice Stevens relied to exclude commercial paper 44
did not survive the final enactment of the Securities Acts. 245 The broadening
of the language in its final form, according to the dissent, indicated that
commercial paper is only one of a potentially larger group of instruments
that the exclusion is designed to cover.246 The dissent's interpretation,
therefore, also refused to recognize the longstanding belief that the exclusion
was limited solely to commercial paper.24 7
2 ELLENBERGER & MAHAR, supra note 1, at item 15 (section 3(a)(3) of the 1933 Act applied
to "short-term paper of the type available for discount at a Federal Reserve bank and of a type
which rarely is bought by private investors").
239. Chief Justice Rehnquist was joined by Justices White, O'Connor, and Scalia. Reves,
110 S. Ct. at 957 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
240. Id.
241. Id. (citing Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 759 (1980); Gilbert v.
United States, 370 U.S. 650, 655 (1962); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59
(1911).
242. See id. at 957-960.
243. 110 S. Ct. at 958.
244. Id. at 958-59; see supra notes 232-38.
245. Reves, 110 S. Ct. at 958-59. The Court quoted the original Senate report, which stated
that " '[n ]otes, drafts, bills of exchange, and bankers' acceptances which are commercial paper
and arise out of current commercial, agricultural, or industrial transactions, and which are not
intended to be marketed to the public, are exempted ....' " Id at 959 (emphasis in original)
(quoting S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933), reprinted in 2 ELLENBERGER & MAHAR,
supra note 1, Item 17)). The Chief Justice then quoted the broader enacted version: "[any
note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which arises out of a current transaction
or the proceeds of which have been or are to be used for current transaction, and which has a
maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months." Id. (emphasis in original)
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(3)).
246. Reves, 110 S. Ct. at 959-60.
247. Id
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V. THE SUPREME COURT GIVES THE BENEFIT OF THE
DOUBT TO ALL NOTES
The Supreme Court in Reves both clarified and left unclear the status of
notes as securities. The Reves' family resemblance test and its presumption
that all notes are securities is consistent with the plain terms of the Securities
Acts248 and provides lower courts with additional guidance to determine
when a note is a security.249 Still, Reves has its weaknesses. Further, the
majority's refusal to confront the exclusion for short-term notes leaves the
status of such notes unclear.
A. The Family Resemblance Test: Giving Effect to the Plain Meaning of
the Statute. Provides Predictability
Reves' rebuttable presumption of coverage for any note is consistent with
the plain terms and broad nature of the Securities Acts.25 ° The Securities
Acts cast a broad net over the types of instruments covered.25' Congress
sought to include as many different types of instruments as necessary to en-
sure maximum investor protection.252 The Reves' family resemblance test
furthers the Securities Acts' goal of protecting the investor rather than sim-
ply regulating or not regulating an instrument based on its label or charac-
terization. For example, Reves' fourth factor is whether another regulatory
scheme reduces the risk of the instrument.25 3 The rationale of the risk-re-
248. The plain terms of the statute indicate that all notes are securities unless the context
otherwise requires. See supra note 12 (quoting the definition of security).
249. See infra text accompanying notes 250-61.
250. But see Sonnenschein, supra note 24, at 1605 (arguing that the presumption of cover-
age may be too inclusive on policy grounds).
251. See supra note 10.
252. See S. Rep. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933), reprinted in 2 ELLENBERGER &
MAHARA supra note 2, Item 17; (quoting Senate Report's discussion of the 1933 Act's goals).
253. 110 S. Ct. 945, 950 (1990). The Court's language did not limit the risk-reducing fac-
tor to only regulatory schemes and, indeed, some post-Reves' courts have considered insurance
or collateralization as sufficient risk-reducing factors in holding an instrument as a non-secur-
ity. See Singer v. Livoti, 741 F. Supp. 1040, 1050 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Diaz Vicente v. Obenauer,
736 F. Supp. 679, 692 (E.D. Va. 1990); Caucus Distrib., Inc. v. Alaska Dep't of Commerce &
Economic Dev., 793 P.2d 1048, 1056 (Alaska 1990). But see Gordon, supra note 51, at 397-98
(noting that secured bonds are securities under the Securities Acts and therefore collateraliza-
tion is not a sufficient risk reducing factor). It would be inconsistent with the disclosure phi-
losophy of the Securities Acts, however, to permit issuers of investment instruments to escape
coverage by privately insuring or collateralizing the instrument. The underlying philosophy of
the Securities Acts is not to eliminate the risk that the investor will lose his money as a result
of an unsound economic decision. Rather, the "risk" the Securities Acts seek to avoid is inves-
tor losses based on incomplete or fraudulent disclosure that induces investors into purchasing
the instrument. See Long, supra note 153, at 159 ("lt]he purpose behind [a disclosure statute]
is to see that the investor has the necessary information before him to make-an intelligent
investment decision .... It does not attempt to pass on the soundness of the investment or to
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ducing factor is that where the risk of the instrument is reduced, the investor
is sufficiently protected and does not need protection under the Securities
Acts.254 Further, while the main goal of the Securities Acts is to protect the
investors, Congress was also concerned with over-burdening the business
community.233 Requiring issuers of notes to comply with the Securities
Acts' regulations when the investor is already sufficiently protected would be
unwarranted. Thus, not only is Reves' fourth factor consistent with the goal
of protecting investors, but it is also consistent with Congress' concern not to
interfere with "honest business.,
256
The Supreme Court's version of the family resemblance test also provides
greater predictability than other tests designed to determine whether notes
are securities.257 The list of non-securities, in conjunction with the pre-ex-
isting four factors raised in Reves, provide additional direction as to whether
prohibit the investor from making a bad choice...."). Non-regulatory risk-reducing schemes
do not satisfy the goals of the Securities Acts. They attempt to reduce the risk that an individ-
ual's investment may decrease in value due to market forces rather than ensuring that the
investor will not be defrauded or misled. Thus, to find a note outside the definition of security
under the risk-reducing factor and to achieve consistency with the underlying philosophy of
the Securities Acts, courts should limit the factor to instances where the risks are reduced by a
regulatory scheme. See also Schneider and Cohen, Reves v. Ernst & Young: A Note-Worthy
Departure in Defining "Security" 23 Review of Sec. Commodities Reg. 191, 199 (Nov. 7, 1990)
(expressing "doubt that a debt instrument publicly offered to non-institutional investors that
otherwise has certain characteristics of a security will become a non-security because of such
risk-reducing factors that do not arise from a governmental regulatory scheme").
254. See Reves 110 S. Ct. at 952. The existence of a risk-reducing factor is similar to the
analysis employed in the risk capital test, which examines the degree of risk accompanying the
transaction to the party purchasing the note. The risk capital test, however, focuses on the risk
that results from the relationship of the parties rather than any extrinsic risk reducing factor.
For a discussion of the risk capital test, see supra text accompanying notes 140-55.
255. H.R. Doc. No. 12, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1933) (goal of the 1933 Act is to protect
investors with the least possible interference to honest business), reprinted in 2 ELLENBERGER
& MAHER, supra note 1, at item 15.
256. See S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933) ("lt]he aim is to prevent further
exploitation of the public by the sale of unsound, fraudulent, and worthless securities through
misrepresentation;... [and] to protect honest enterprise, seeking capital by honest presenta-
tion, against the competition afforded by dishonest securities"), reprinted in 2 ELLENBERGER
& MAHER, supra note 1, at item 17 (1973).
257. For a discussion on the criticisms of the commercial investment test, see supra notes
136-38 and accompanying text. For a discussion on the criticisms of the risk capital test, see
supra text accompanying notes 154-55 and Sonnenschein, supra note 24, at 1603.
The commercial/investment and risk capital approaches require courts to evaluate
transactions by reference to a relatively abstract set of characteristics, with little gui-
dance for the determination of coverage in ambiguous cases. By contrast, the Second
Circuit approach instructs courts to compare transactions to a set of concrete exam-
pies, and directs that all ambiguous cases be resolved in favor of coverage.
Id; see also text accompanying note 165 (Second Circuit criticisms of the two tests).
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a note is covered under the Securities Acts.25 Although Reves' flexibility
may lead to vague or abstract formulations of the attributes of a security,2"9
the concrete examples of non-securities constrain vague formulations."
Further, because it is flexible, the family resemblance test can be adapted to
the endless number of transactions that involve notes. A per se test would
otherwise enable the shrewd investment promoter to escape Securities Act
coverage by working around a more determinate test.26'
B. Reves' Four Factors" The Majority's Failure to
Guide Their Application
While the concrete examples of non-securities in the Reves' test has pro-
vided some additional guidance, the relative weights of the four factors used
to find resemblance to the non-securities is uncertain. The Reves' Court
stated that the four factors it devised are the factors that the Court has previ-
ously applied in deciding whether a transaction involves a security.262 Yet it
is unclear from the Court's opinion whether all four factors must be met or
258. See Sonnenschein, supra note 24, at 1603 (Second Circuit's family resemblance test
"represents a step towards greater certainty and consistency of decision than is available under
the other formulations"). But see Steinberg, supra note 186, at 684 (author argues that the test
is indefinite unless the particular note falls within one of the enumerated categories).
259. See Sonnenschein, supra note 24, at 1603.
260. See icL
261. One commentator has noted that because note transactions involve infinite variations,
such variation could be employed to "undermine even the most comprehensive test for the
determination of antifraud coverage." Sonnenschein, supra note 24, at 1588. Further, a more
determinate test could attain even greater certainty, but only at the expense of the Court's
stated desire to retain a "flexible rather than a static principle" in intepreting the Securities
Acts. SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946); see also SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963) (federal securities legislation " 'enacted for
the purpose of avoiding frauds' [is to be construed] not technically and restrictively, but flexi-
bly to effectuate its remedial purposes") (quoting 3 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUC-
TION 382 (3d ed. 1943)). The Reves Court also noted the advantages of a flexible approach:
An approach founded on economic reality rather than on a set of per se rules is
subject to the criticism that whether a particular note is a "security" may not be
entirely clear at the time it is issued. Such an approach has the corresponding advan-
tage, though, of permitting the SEC and the courts sufficient flexibility to ensure that
those who market investments are not able to escape the coverage of the Securities
Acts by creating new instruments that would not be covered by a more determinate
definition. One could question whether, at the expense of the goal of clarity, Con-
gress overvalued the goal of avoiding manipulation by the clever and dishonest. If
Congress erred, however, it is for that body, and not this Court, to correct its
mistake.
110 S. Ct. 945, 950 n.2 (1990).
262. 110 S. Ct. at 951-52. Indeed, the Court cites to specific Supreme Court decisions after
describing each factor. See supra text accompanying notes 200-12.
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whether a balancing approach must be applied to determine whether the
instrument is a security.
With respect to the "risk reducing" factor, however, the Court stated that
application of the Securities Acts was "unnecessary" if a risk-reducing factor
was present. 6 3 Thus, if Securities Act coverage is "unnecessary," an instru-
ment will not be a security, irrespective of the other three factors.2 ' If an-
other regulatory scheme is not present, however, an examination of the other
three factors becomes essential.
The Court's language is far more ambiguous with respect to the applica-
tion of the other three factors. If the Court intended a balancing approach
with respect to these factors, the predictive capability of the test would be
reduced because the Court failed to give the relative weights of each fac-
tor.26 A balancing approach, however, is consistent with the Court's desire
for flexibility and its concern that sophisticated promoters could easily
cicumvent a more rigid test.266 Moreover, although a three factor balancing
approach may suffer from the same indefiniteness as both the commercial/
investment and the risk capital tests, 267 the Reves' family resemblance test
provides a list of specific examples to guide the courts' application of the
factors to the instrument in question. Finally, because the factors are used
to find "resemblance" to a lisi ed non-security, the Reves' Court may have
intended a more subjective balancing approach.
263. Reves, 110 S. Ct. at 952.
264. The Court's discussion of Marine Bank as support for the fourth factor suggests that
it will be dispositive. Reves, 110 S. Ct. at 953. In Marine Bank, the Court held that the
existence of the federal banking laws provided sufficient protection to the investor of a CD and
therefore that the CD was not a security. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 559 (1982).
The Court in Reves also cited to Daniel, where the Court supported its holding that a non-
contributory pension plan was not a security by noting that it was sufficiently regulated by
ERISA. Reves, 110 S. Ct. at 953 (citing International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel,
439 U.S. 551, 569-70 (1979)); see also Schneider and Cohen, supra note 253.
265. See Gordon, supra note 51, at 398.
266. See supra note 261. The Court noted that because the definition was framed in such
broad terms and the legislative history indicates that it was intended to be interpreted flexibly,
the Court believed it was bound to a flexible test and that only Congress can "correct its
mistake." Reves, 110 S. Ct. at 950 n.2.
267. See supra text accompanying notes 136-38, 154-55. By naming the factors that it
believes are most relevant in determining whether a note is a security, the Court eliminated the
multitude of factors thought to be relevant under the commercial/investment test. Under the
commercial/investment test, courts could inquire into any one of a long list of factors that
judicial precedent deemed relevant to distinguish investment notes from commercial notes. By
narrowing the list to four factors in Reves. the Court has essentially weighed the factors of the
commercial/investment test and eliminated the uncertainty as to what factors the courts must
consider. But see Schneider & Cohen, supra note 253, at 199 (predicting that courts will reach
result-oriented outcomes, and then that the motivations and public expectations factors will be
"recited appropriately in a manner consistent with the result reached").
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Furthermore, because it is theoretically possible to find that a note is a
security even if one factor is not met, a balancing approach is necessary.
First, the plan of distribution factor, was satisfied in Reves because the notes
were issued to a broad segment of the public.2 68 It is conceivable, however,
that a security will be found even where the instrument is not issued to the
general public.2 69 Second, the issuer's motivation and public expectations
factors will often be indeterminate. Because an issuer often has multiple
purposes for issuing notes, the motivations factor probably should be neu-
tral, rather than one that weighs against finding a security. 7° In addition,
although the public expectations factor proved easily applicable in Reves be-
cause the instruments were advertised as investments, an investor typically
would not have any expectation about the characterization of the instrument
under the Securities Acts.27 Indeed, earlier in the opinion, the Court recog-
nized that an investor may assume that stock is covered under the Securities
Acts, but that the same could not be said of notes because of the variety of
268. Reves, 110 S. Ct. at 953.
269. This is particularly true when securities are sold to a few institutional investors. Fur-
thermore, in Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985), the Court found that
stock sold to a single investor was a security. 471 U.S. at 697. Arguably, the plan of distribu-
tion factor should not be relied on in determining whether an instrument is a security. The
Securities Acts provide specific exemptions from the registration and reporting requirements,
but not the antifraud provisions, for issuances that do not involve public offerings. This sug-
gests that Congress intended that instruments that are issued to a few investors must remain
subject to antifraud provisions and may still be deemed securities.
270. See Schneider & Cohen, supra note 253, at 196 ("A typical business enterprise gener-
ates funds from multiple sources and uses them for multiple purposes more or less simultane-
ously.") On the other hand, the purchaser's motivation will most likely always be clear
because of his interest in the profit of the note. But see Steinberg, supra note 186, at 680
(unless it is clear that the seller's motivation is solely commercial and the buyer's motivation is
not for profit, the notes should be securities provided the remaining three factors are met).
271. Schneider & Cohen, supra note 253, at 198. Arguably, the Court's language indicates
that the public expectations factor may in some cases be dispositive. The Court stated that it
would find a security based on the reasonable expectations of the investing public, "even where
an economic analysis of the circumstances of the particular transaction might suggest that the
instruments are not 'securities' as used in that transaction." Reves, 110 S. Ct. at 952. This
approach is similar to that used in Landreth Timber for stock. Landreth Timber Co. V. Lan-
dreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985). The Reves' Court suggests that if the customer reasonably believed
that he was investing in a security, then the Court will find a security, regardless of the eco-
nomic realities of the transaction. This probably does not reveal, however, that the Court will
disregard the remaining two factors. First, the public expectations factor will be guided by the
investors' motivations or purposes, the first factor in the analysis. Second, the public expecta-
tions factor assumes that the instrument was distributed to the public, thereby satisfying Reves'
second factor, the plan of distribution. Thus, although it appears from the Court's language
that the public's reasonable expectations will be dispositive, an inquiry into public expectations
inherently includes an inquiry into the motivations and plan of distribution factors.
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contexts in which they are issued."2 Theoretically, then, if the issuer's moti-
vations and the public expectations are unclear, and no regulatory scheme
that reduces the risk exists, the Reves' family resemblance test hinges on the
plan of distribution.2 73 Thus, as certain factors will undoubtedly be unclear,
it is probable that courts must weigh the Reves' factors to determine whether
the instrument in fact strongly resembles a listed non-security.274
C. The Short-Term Note Exclusion
The majority in Reves was unwilling to settle the long-standing debate
over the application of the exclusion for notes with a maturity of nine
months or less, but instead offered a limited holding with respect to demand
notes.27 Although the petitioners based their argument on the widely held
view that the exclusion is limited to commercial paper,2 6 the majority indi-
cated that it was unnecessary to look beyond the plain meaning of the Secur-
ities Acts and held that demand notes are not excluded.2 7
The Court's decision that demand notes are not covered under the exclu-
sion rested on its interpretation of the term "maturity., 271 Justice Marshall
determined that when a note matures is a question of federal law, not state
law.27 9 The majority refused to follow state law fearing that it would result
in inconsistent application of the Securities Act4.280 The majority's concern
was misplaced. The absence of any federal interpretation of a demand note's
maturity implicitly requires the Court to start with a clean federal slate and
272. Reves, 110 S. Ct. at 950. Given the difficulty that courts have had in determining
when a note is covered under the Securities Acts, it is hard to imagine that the average inves-
tor, or even the institutional investor, would necessarily expect coverage under the Securities
Acts. Indeed, the Reves' family resemblance test is supposed to eliminate the uncertainty in
determining when a note is a security. The Court's focus on public expectations, however, is
not on a reasoned determination requiring the average investor to analyze the note under the
family resemblance test. The analysis is more likely focused on the investors' perceptions of
the note as a result of the circumstances surrounding its issuance.
273. Some commentators believe that the plan of distribution factor will in fact determine
the instrument's status in many instances. See, e.g., Schneider and Cohen, supra note 253, at
195-96.
274. Some commentators argue that the Reves' factors are similar to the Howey factors and
therefore, because all factors of the Howey test must be met, all factors of the Reves test must
also be met. See Gordon, supra note 51, at 393-98; Steinberg, supra note 186, at 679. Courts
may find resemblance to a listed non-security for other reasons, but to be consistent with
Reves, they will likely limit their written opinions to the four Reves' factors. See Schneider &
Cohen, supra note 253, at 199.
275. Reves, 110 S. Ct. at 955.
276. See infra notes 286-88 and accompanying text.
277. Reves, 110 S. Ct. at 954.
278. See supra text accompanying notes 221-31.
279. Reves, 110 S. Ct. at 954.
280. Id.
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establish the requisite federal interpretation.2"' As Chief Justice Rehnquist
indicated, when interpreting an ambiguous term, the Court must depend on
the common understanding of the term at the time of the statute's crea-
tion.282 Hence, with no federal law to look to, the dissent argued that the
Court may defer to state law interpretations for guidance.283 The interpreta-
tions of the majority of state courts revealed that demand notes are consid-
ered subject to immediate maturity.28 4 Therefore, if the majority had looked
to state law for direction, it could have established a federal interpretation
that would find demand notes within the exclusion's purview.
The majority's refusal to look beyond the plain meaning of the exclusion
left a significant issue unresolved. As Justice Stevens noted in his concur-
rence, the courts of appeals have construed the exclusion to include solely
commercial paper.285 Furthermore, the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion expressed its interpretation of the exclusion as limited to commercial
paper that is prime quality, not ordinarily purchased by the general public,
used to finance current operations, and eligible for discounting by the Fed-
281. In SEC v. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946), the Court noted that prior state interpre-
tation had "crystallized" the definition of "investment contract," and it adopted a modified
form of those state interpretations. Id. at 298.
282. Reves 110 S. Ct. at 957 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
283. Id. In Ruefenacht v. O'Halloran, 737 F.2d 320 (3d Cir. 1984), aff'd sub nomL Gould
v. Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701 (1985), the Third Circuit, after discussing the Howey test, stated
"by 1946 it was plain that the definitions in the 1933 and 1934 Acts drew on state law for their
content." Id at 329. The dissent in Reves cited previous Supreme Court cases where the
Court relied on state blue sky laws and lower court decisions to determine the scope of the
federal securities laws. 110 S. Ct. at 958. In SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., the Court
relied on state court decisions in its determination whether interests in oil and gas leases were a
type of security. 320 U.S. 344, 352-55 (1943). Again in Howey, the Court was faced with
interpreting the definition of the term "investment contract." 328 U.S. at 297. Because the
term was neither defined in the Act nor in the legislative history, the majority relied on the
prior state law decision for guidance and found that "[by including an investment contract...
Congress was using a term the meaning of which had been crystallized by... prior judicial
interpretation." Id. at 298.
284. See American Wholesale Corp. v. Bryant, 2 F.2d 31, 32 (5th Cir. 1924); In the Matter
of Las Colinas, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 582, 595 (D.P.R. 1968); Peterson v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 102
Ariz. 434, 432 P.2d 446 (1967); Northcutt v. Massie, 201 Tenn. 638, 301 S.W.2d 355 (1957);
Hotel Lanier Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ga. 604, 30 S.E. 558 (1898); see Reves. 110 S. Ct. at 957
(citing M. BIGELOW, THE LAW OF BILLS, NoTEs, AND CHECKS, § 349 at 265 (3d ed. W. Lile
Rev. 1928) and 8 C.J. Bills and Notes § 602, n.83 (1916)).
285. Reves 110 S. Ct. at 955 (Stevens, J., concurrence). See supra text accompanying notes
232-38. Several courts have emphasized that it is the character of the note and the nature of
the transaction that determine Securities Act coverage, not its maturity. C.N.S. Enters. v. G.
& G. Enters., Inc., 508 F.2d 1354, 1361 (7th Cir.) (citing SEC v. Continental Commodities
Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 524-25 (5th Cir. 1974)), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975)).
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eral Reserve.28 6 According to Justice Stevens, such a deep-rooted interpre-
tation "should not be disturbed.,
28 7
Indeed, the interpretation was not disturbed. It was ignored. The Court
evaded the issue by limiting its holding to demand notes.288 The Court's
failure to interpret the exclusion also left unclear whether the presumption
of coverage under the Reves' family resemblance test applies to securities
with a maturity of less than nine months.2 89 Furthermore, although the
Court found that the demand notes in Reves fell outside of the exclusion, the
Court suggested that some demand notes intended by both parties to mature
within the nine month period might fall within the exclusion. 2' The Court,
however, failed to supply guidelines for determining under what circum-
stances those demand notes could be excluded from Securities Acts' regula-
tion. If the Court had otherwise construed the exclusion, the full ambit of
issues with respect to short-term notes would have been settled. As a result
of the limited holding, the status of notes with a fixed maturity of nine
months or less remains uncertain.
VI. EFFECT ON THE CORPORATE PLANNER
Prior to Reves, with the exception of the Second Circuit, the issuer could
take comfort in knowing that his note was not covered under the Securities
Acts unless a plaintiff overcame the burden of proving coverage. A pre-
sumption of coverage for all notes under the Reves' family resemblance test
now shifts a heavy burden to the issuer to show that the note is not a security
and therefore not covered under the Securities Acts.29 1 The practical effect
of this presumption is that some issuers might assume coverage rather than
risk violating the registration and antifraud provisions of the Securities
Acts. 292 Although Reves' four factors suffer from the same indefiniteness as
286. Securities Act of 1933, Release No. 4412, 26 Fed. Reg. 9158 (Sept. 20, 1961).
287. Reyes, 110 S. Ct. at 956.
288. Id. at 955.
289. See id. at 951 n.3 (majority).
290. See id. at 955.
291. Both the commercial/investment test and risk capital test presumed non-coverage.
See supra text accompanying notes 135-55.
292. For the small issuer, however, this may not be a viable alternative because of the high
cost of complying with the regulations. 15 U.S.C. 77f(b) (1988) (filing fee for registration
statements). In addition to the filing fees, issuers incur legal, printing, and accounting fees.
See, e.g., WASHINGTON REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUST, REGISTRATION STATEMENT, Pt.
II, item 14 (April 25, 1990). Issuers offering notes that are specifically listed as non-securities
in Reves' family resemblance test, however, may take comfort in knowing that the notes are
not securities.
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the commercial/investment test, the expandable list of non-securities will
provide additional direction to the corporate planner.293
VII. CONCLUSION
Since the enactment of the Securities Acts, the Supreme Court has strug-
gled with establishing a definitive test to determine an instrument's status as
a security. This struggle is partially attributed to the evolution of a vast
array of innovative instruments purchased and sold in varying transactions.
Beginning with Landreth, the Supreme Court has determined that no single
test can encompass all the instruments which necessarily fall under the defi-
nition of a "security." Reves v. Ernst & Young established a test tailored
exclusively for determining if notes are securities. Adopting a separate test
for notes wisely and accurately reflects the inadequacy of attempting to ap-
ply uniformly one test to a multitude of distinct instruments. Developing
tests that are specifically tailored to particular instruments will provide some
degree of certainty in the application of the Securities Acts.
But with respect to notes that seemingly fall within the short-term note
exclusion, Reves failed to confront the issue directly. The majority's reason-
ing was inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent and failed to recognize
the contemporaneous understanding of the term "maturity." Moreover, the
Court's unwillingness to resolve the longstanding debate over the exclusion's
meaning left the status of a large class of notes in a state of uncertainty.
Undoubtedly, Reves alleviated the uncertainty over the appropriate analy-
sis to be employed in note transactions. Although the meaning of the short-
term note exclusion is still unclear, the Reves' family resemblance test
strengthens the ability to predict whether a note will fall within the Securi-
ties Acts' prohibitions. Notwithstanding this decision, the Supreme Court
will likely confront the definition of a security again as the markets continue
to develop novel instruments.2 94
Scott D. Museles
293. As judicial precedent construes or expands the defined categories, the family resem-
blance test will probably become a more predictable method of analysis for the corporate plan-
ner. See Steinberg, supra note 186, at 684.
294. Since the enactment of the Securities Acts, the Supreme Court admittedly has strug-
gled to develop a universal test for determining whether a security exists. Although it was
once believed that the Howey test "embodie[d] the essential attributes that run through all of
the Court's decisions defining a security," United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S.
837, 852 (1975), beginning with Landreth, the Court began to establish tests that were not
universal. Instead, the Court created separate tests for different types of instruments. Reves
reaffirmed that the Howey test is limited.
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